

# Belarus'

# FOREIGN POLICY INDEX

No.17 November-December 2013

Dear readers,

It is our pleasure to present the seventeenth issue of Belarus' Foreign Policy Index, a publication which analyzes the status of Belarus's five foreign policy priority areas in November and December 2013.

In late 2013, the Belarusian leadership kept stalling the implementation of the integration projects with **Russia**. Nevertheless, Russia continued subsidizing the Belarusian economy, albeit subject to political and economic conditionality. Overall, Belarus stayed within the track of Russia's foreign policy efforts.

In the near term, Belarus will likely have to say goodbye to some of its assets, but this will probably happen in the second half of 2014, when official Minsk needs additional financing in the run up to the presidential election. At the same time, any rigid public pressure by the Kremlin on its western neighbor is out of the question because of both the moods in the Russian establishment and the need for Russia to keep its integration endeavor look appealing.

The main trend in Belarus's relationship with the **European Union** is the formation of a negotiating agenda. This became possible following a statement by Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej at the EaP Summit in Vilnius about the willingness of official Minsk to pursue visa facilitation with the EU. Intense diplomatic contacts between Belarus and the European Union continued during the final months of 2013.

Apparently, the trend towards the intensification of contacts and normalization of the relationship between Belarus and the EU will continue throughout 2014, the two key reasons being the upcoming presidential election campaign and the Ice Hockey World Championship in Minsk. The Belarusian authorities will obviously try to maintain a most favorable international ambience.

The relationship between Belarus and **China** went through a rather quiet period. In the meantime, there are signals that Minsk has been increasingly cautious and has adopted a more demanding attitude to its collaboration with China. One reason for this may be the growing disappointment over the benefit of having China as a facilitator of the resolution of some critical issues. Therefore, the year 2014 may witness a more moderate approach of official Minsk to China.

Belarus's efforts in the **developing countries** are going through a series of fundamental transformations. Minsk has isolated itself from most of its partners in the Middle East. The Belarusian administration is making consistent efforts to expand its relationships with Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Belarus is working to pass its Venezuelan collaboration experience on to the neighboring Latin American states. Meanwhile, Minsk has de facto minimized its activities in the developing world that can enrage the West.

The year 2014 will probably see Minsk continue its policy to build up contacts, primarily with the Latin American nations, as well as in South and Southeast Asia

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13 "Developing world"

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(Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia). Diplomatic efforts will be redoubled in Africa. The economic ties with Iran will remain in place; however, Minsk will try its best to avoid political contacts.

In November, Belarus showed its full support for **Ukraine's** European integration ambition, which could have meant new opportunities for Minsk once the geopolitical landscape in the region changed. However, the frustration of Ukraine's EU Association Agreement that followed prompted official Minsk to adjust its expectations — Belarus will now have a serious competitor for Russian subsidies.



Now that Yanukovich and Putin have reached agreements on the most pressing issues, one should not rule out the possibility of new conflicts between Kyiv and Minsk, primarily over the import of Belarusian-made oil products.

We wish you a peasant reading and invite you to share your comments and opinions.

Dzianis Melyantsou

Belarus' Foreign Policy Index Editor

## Relations development indices:



# Developments in Belarus-Russia relations

+39



-2

Summary index: +37

Total positive points: +39

Total negative points: -2

## Main trends

In November and December 2013, the Belarusian administration continued its attempts to rely on Russian subsidies for the stability of the Belarusian socioeconomic model. Simultaneously, official Minsk was making efforts to stall the implementation of the integration projects pursued by the Kremlin, especially as far as the privatization of state assets was concerned. As we mentioned in previous Index issues, the aggravation of the socioeconomic situation in the country makes the Russian authorities more willing to provide additional support for their western ally. However, the accumulation of economic woes and de facto squandering of Russian subsidies will inevitably result in Russia building up its influence in Belarus ahead of the presidential election due in 2015.

As was predicted in the previous Index issues, after all Belarus and Russia have managed to meet halfway; however, the Kremlin's appetites kept growing. Under the circumstances, it is getting increasingly harder for Belarus to dodge its privatization obligations. Russia continues subsidizing the Belarusian economy at a rate that is sufficient to maintain the current situation. However, these subsidies naturally envisage an increase in Belarus's liabilities to Russia in the form of loans obligations further encumbered by political and economic conditionality.

Belarus was not making any sharp moves with regard to Russia and generally remained within the track of the Russian foreign policy endeavor relying on the final installment of the EurAsEC loan, a USD 2 billion "modernization" loan, and approval of a fuel balance for 2014 according to its own scenario.

## Description of the main events

Official Minsk's persistent attempts to get Moscow to increase its financial backing while meeting as few of its commitments in the framework of integration processes were front and center on the Belarus-Russia agenda at the end of 2013. The best-case scenario for Belarus is known to all: it seeks to have Russia abolish crude oil export duties, approve the oil supplies balance for 2014 at 23 million tons, and provide Belarus with the sixth and final installment of the EurAsEC ACF loan, extend at least a USD 2 billion "modernization" loan to Belarus, give up on the privatization of five Belarusian assets (MAZ, MZKT, Peleng, Grodno Azot and Integral), and resuscitate a potash cartel with Russia. Further, Belarus wants Russia to discontinue efforts to privatize other enterprises in the country and insists that integration decisions within the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space (CES) have a non-binding nature.

The outcomes of the period under review show that Belarus was only partially successful, and some of its few victories will be short-lived. In part, Russia's concessions further increase Belarus's dependence on the eastern neighbor and can be associated with the reluctance of the Kremlin to exacerbate the situation amid both integration processes and predicament in some of the neighboring countries, especially in Ukraine.

Belarus never managed to have Russia abolish the crude oil export duty, and all statements made by Russian high-ranking officials could be reduced to a simple formula:

the abolition of duties can only be negotiated as part of a strategy to deepen integration processes. The sixth and final EurAsEC ACF loan installment was not provided, despite the fact that Belarus enjoyed the previous five installments (almost never on schedule, though) whenever it failed to meet its obligations to reform the national economy.

The decision of the Kremlin to provide a USD 2 billion loan, which official Minsk had sought since the March session of the Supreme State Council of the Union State, was interpreted as a major victory of Belarusian diplomacy. The loan was necessitated by both the situation in Ukraine and serious problems in the Belarusian economy. To leave Belarus will no financial aid immediately after Moscow approved a USD 15 billion credit facility for Ukraine would have left a big portion of the Russian establishment perplexed. On the other hand, the status of the Belarusian economy is quite alarming. The IPM Research Center said in a report that if the current economic policy remained in place, the Belarusian authorities would have to procure at least USD 4.5-5 billion in external finance<sup>1</sup>. The Russian USD 2 billion loan covers this amount only partially. The lending terms are quite interesting: essentially, one can only be certain about the USD 450 million installment that has been approved by the Russian government. It is not yet clear where the rest of the money will come from, meaning that the decision may be disavowed before the entire amount is transferred to Belarus.

An important achievement recorded during the final months of the year was the approval of a six-month fuel balance, rather than a quarterly balance, which was typical of 2013. The amount of Russian crude oil to be delivered during the first half of 2014, at 11.5 million tons suggests that there is a chance for Belarus to receive the coveted 23 million tons of Russian oil in 2014, albeit subject to certain conditions.

When it comes to two-way trade with Russia, the statistics covering the period of January-October 2013 make it clear that there is a positive trend towards an increase in Belarusian export supplies amid a reduction in import from Russia, compared to the same period in 2012. Export deliveries went up by 4.5% year-on-year, whereas import fell by 19.2%. Belarus recorded a deficit of USD 4.889 billion during the first ten months of the year, which was less than half of the amount reported in January-October 2012, at USD 9.973 billion. However, the problem is that nearly all Belarusian industries saw their deliveries to Russia go down, and some reported very serious drops in export volumes. Truck supplies to Russia fell by 33.6% year-on-year, truck tractor supplies dropped by 56.2%, and tractor deliveries shrank by 11%. On the other hand, milk export rose by 28.2%, and sugar export soared by 56.2% (sugar is de facto a re-exported product). This trend corroborates the conclusion about the aggravation of recession phenomena in the Belarusian economy and reduction in its competitive power that was previously made by some experts. The progress of the agrarian sector should be attributed to a great extent to sales at dumping prices in the Russian market and massive state support for agribusiness. The fall in import should be ascribed to the reduction in the import of oil products, which amounted to only 0.9% of the January-October 2012 volumes. Nevertheless, the main problem is that this trade pattern reflects the discontinuation of the "solvents-diluents" scheme — in other words, the decrease in Russian import supplies (hence the reduction in the trade deficit with that country) affects Belarus's export deliveries to the EU (hence the fall in the trade surplus with Europe). During the ten months in question, Belarus's export to the Netherlands dropped by 54.1% year-on-year, export to Poland fell by 20%, and export to Latvia went down by 85.1%.

As for the rest of the political issues — the creation of a Russian air base, alignment of positions on the key international problems, promotion of spiritual culture in keeping with Russian standards — Belarus meticulously keeps to its original obligations.

1 Z. Zajac. Belarus might face a triple deficit - [http://naviny.by/rubrics/finance/2013/11/04/jc\\_articles\\_114\\_183542/print/](http://naviny.by/rubrics/finance/2013/11/04/jc_articles_114_183542/print/)

## Forecast for the near term

In the short term, Belarus will have to say goodbye to some of its assets, but this will likely happen in the second half of 2014, when official Minsk needs more money in the run up to the presidential election campaign.

Belarus has virtually lost the room for foreign policy maneuver. Neither the EU nor — even more so — China can be regarded, even hypothetically, as alternatives to the Russian foreign policy focus. Alternatively, given Belarus's economic predicament, the arsenal of Russia's foreign policy instruments is also limited. Harsh public pressure on Belarus is out of the question now because of both the moods in the Russian establishment, including the financial interests of some major Russian businessmen in Belarus, and the need for the Kremlin to maintain the appeal of its integration initiative. Apparently, in this context, the Belarusian leadership will have the support that it requires while dodging most of its obligations (it will not be able to evade all of them, though), provided it manages to benefit from effective lobbying.

# Developments in Belarus-EU relations

+22



0

Summary index: +22

Total positive points: +22

Total negative points: 0

## Main trends

The trend that stood out during the period under review was the shaping of an agenda for Belarus's relationship with the European Union, which, however, has neither been finalized nor officially approved yet. The formation of the agenda became possible following Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej's statement at the EaP Summit in Vilnius that official Minsk was ready to embark on negotiations over visa facilitation with the European Union.

Also in November and December 2013, active diplomatic contacts between Belarus and the bloc continued, building on the main trend of the year. Throughout the year 2013, this tendency was manifested in a slew of contacts between high-ranking officials of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry with heads of the diplomatic missions and institutions of the European Union in Minsk, as well as the contacts of Belarusian diplomats in Europe. However, as we mentioned in previous issues of the Foreign Policy Index, the impressive number of contacts did not result in any quality breakthrough. Specifically, the problem of political prisoners remains unresolved, while the visa facilitation initiative remains a declaration.

## Description of the main events

The analyzed period in the relationship between Belarus and the European Union was marked by the Summit of the Eastern Partnership initiative that took place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. Preparations for the Summit topped the agenda during the last month of autumn, whereas the first half of December — up until the beginning of the holiday season — was marked by discussions of its results.

In the run up to the Summit, as well as throughout almost the entire year 2013, the level of Belarus's representative at the Vilnius Summit remained one of the most discussed issues. The problem of political prisoners was directly associated with the decision on the one to represent the country. Although Belarus never managed to take the issue of political prisoners off the table, the European Union, represented by Lithuania, which held the rotating presidency in the EU, took a step towards Belarus by sending it an invitation to the Summit, which was identical to the ones sent to the other partner countries, both in its form and essence. Back on 15 October, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Andrius Krivas handed over an invitation addressed to the country rather than any specific official to the Belarusian ambassador in Lithuania.

Official Minsk, for its part, dragged out the decision on the head of the Belarusian delegation to the Summit. Only a few days before the start of the event, the prediction we made in the previous Index issue came true, as it was announced that the delegation would be headed by Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej.

Therefore, unlike the Warsaw Summit of 2011, Belarus was represented at a higher level. The event was not marked by any unpleasant incidents or scandals. When talking to the media, Makiej emphasized the significance of the summit "from the point of view of its positive context and its positive atmosphere". This evaluation of the Summit should be attributed to the treatment of Belarus as an equal during the distribution of invitations to partner countries.

As one should have expected, in his speech during the plenary session of the Summit Makiej underlined the need for developing an equal and non-discriminatory approach. He also formulated three "false choices" that he believes the EU imposes on its Eastern Partnership partners. Those were "Your Way or the EU Way"; "Take It or Leave It" (meaning that the European Union should pay heed to the opinion of its partners concerning partnership development options); and "East or West".

Belarus had a pleasant surprise in store for the organizers of the event, as Uladzimir Makiej announced that the country was willing to begin negotiating visa facilitation with the EU, "on condition both sides adopt a constructive attitude".

Makiej's statement, unlike the planned initialing of the Association Agreements with Georgia and Moldova, became one of the few pleasant surprises of the Summit. Its significance lies in the fact that it outlines at least some sort of an agenda for the Belarus-EU relationship. There had been no such agenda in the bilateral framework since the presidential election of 2010.

Another proof that the Belarusian authorities treated the Summit as a positive experience and opportunity was that the Summit featured the Business Forum, attended by Economy Minister Mikalaj Snapkoŭ. The idea of the forum corresponds to official Minsk's vision of the essence and benefit of the Eastern Partnership: its primary objective is to intensify economic collaboration. This is why Belarus had been among the countries calling for institutionalizing the Business Forum within the Eastern Partnership initiative.

No significant events were registered in the framework of the relationship between Belarus and the EU in November and December 2013, apart from the Summit. Active diplomatic contacts continued in both Minsk and the EU countries of accreditation of Belarusian embassies. Interestingly, during the most recent period under review, it was Deputy Foreign Minister Aliaksandr Hurjanaŭ that became the "prime mover" of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry (he paid visits to Slovakia, France and Poland).

The signing of the Agreement on the financing of the project "Mobility Scheme for Targeted People-to-People Contacts" (MOST) between Belarus and the European Commission in the framework of the Annual Action Programme for Belarus on 20 December became another high-profile event recorded during the period in question. The document was signed by Deputy Prime Minister Anatol Tozik. The agreement envisages the provision of EU's technical assistance amounting to EUR5 million for the expansion of people-to-people contacts between Belarus and the EU in culture, education, youth affairs and scientific research.

Two-way trade between Belarus and the European Union member states totaled USD 19.2 billion in January-November 2013, a drop by 23% year-on-year. Belarusian export reached USD 9.62 billion, a fall by 42% from the first eleven months of 2012. Import from the EU amounted to USD 9.56 billion, an increase by 15.2% year-on-year. Two-way trade with the European Union therefore came to a surplus of USD 65.9 million for Belarus.

## Forecast for the near term

The ongoing trend towards the intensification of diplomatic contacts and normalization of the relationship between Belarus and the EU will likely continue throughout the year 2014, unless some unexpected events occur. This is due primarily to the upcoming

presidential election, due in 2015. The Belarusian authorities traditionally try their best to minimize political risks ahead of the main election campaign of the five-year cycle. One such risk is the possibility of an aggravation of relations with Europe.

Another factor standing behind the aspiration of official Minsk to further improve its relationship with the European Union is the Ice Hockey World Championship that will be held in Minsk in May 2014. The country will play host to such an important sports forum for the first time in its history, and the authorities will be doing their utmost to create a most favorable international environment.

One can expect official Minsk to continue building on the visa facilitation initiative seeking to flesh out the emerging agenda.

# Developments in Belarus-China relations

+11



0

Summary index: +11

Total positive points: +11

Total negative points: 0

## Main trends

Both November and December 2013 saw a rather quiet period in Belarus-China relations. A large portion of this section of the Foreign Policy Index centers on the meetings that the outgoing ambassador of China to Belarus, Gong Jianwei, had with high-ranking Belarusian officials.

In the meantime, there are indirect indications that Minsk is paying increasing attention to its collaboration with China and has adopted a more demanding attitude. This turn is prompted by the relative progress in Belarus's relationship with Russia, where the critical issue of the search for money has been temporarily resolved, as well as the growing disappointment over the value of China as a partner capable of helping Belarus out with some essential problems.

As we mentioned in the previous Index issues covering 2013, the main features of the relationship between Belarus and China were its evolution in keeping with China's scenario, along with the lack of any significant progress in some of the high-profile joint projects, first of all in the promotion of the China-Belarus Industrial Park (CBIP), China's penetration in the high-tech sectors of Belarus, and shortage of major investments from China. These tendencies remain relevant in 2014.

## Description of the main events

Many of the events in the framework of Belarus's relations with China in the period 1 November through 31 December were associated with outgoing Ambassador Gong Jianwei and his meetings with high-ranking Belarusian officials. Meetings of this kind are typically included in the diplomatic protocol; however, the ambassador and the Belarusian media did their best to emphasize that the meetings were more than a mere formality.

Gong Jianwei is an experienced professional Chinese diplomat who speaks a fluent Russian almost without any accent. He specializes in the former Soviet Union and has held various positions in Chinese diplomatic offices in the USSR and the CIS since 1974. He was appointed ambassador to Belarus in 2012.

The diplomat obviously did a good job for his country to benefit from the economic cooperation with Belarus. China remains the least beneficial foreign trade partner of Belarus from the point of view of the export/import ratio. In January-October 2013, export from Belarus accounted for only 14.5% of the total trade turnover, while import accounted for the remaining 85.5%. To compare: the export/import ratio with the other key trade partners is as follows — 33.6% to 66.4% for Poland, 36.4% to 63.6% for Germany, and 42.6% to 57.4% for Russia. This imbalance has a strong propensity to grow: compared to the first ten months of 2012, export to China went up by 1.6% in January-October 2013, while import from China expanded by 34.1%. The export/import ratio stood at



15.4% to 84.6% back in January-October 2012. By November 1, 2013, total trade between Belarus and China had expanded by 28.1% year-on-year; Belarus saw its trade deficit broaden to USD 1.968 billion, up from USD 1.941 billion in January-December 2012.

The meeting between Belarus's President Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Meng Jianzhu, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, became an important positive development in the relationship between the two countries. Unfortunately, the details of the meeting were not reported. Nevertheless, the very fact of such a visit is untypical of Chinese diplomacy, as Meng Jianzhu did not lead a strong representative delegation to Belarus, which is why there were no meetings or negotiations in relevant ministers and agencies. The visitor is a high-ranking party functionary who formally holds no office. Chinese diplomacy treats the Presidential Administration of Belarus as a structure of the same level as the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee (applying the model of the Soviet-Chinese relations). However, given the demonstrative non-party platform of Lukashenka and his status as the head of state, it is clear that official Beijing seeks to maintain contacts with the Belarusian state leader at the level of the high-ranking party officials who also hold a public office. In this context, Meng Jianzhu looked more like a special envoy visiting Belarus on an extremely important mission. Unfortunately, analysts can only make guesses as to the real nature of the visit.

Meng Jianzhu's professional experience is quite interesting. Prior to his appointment as the head of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee in November 2012, he headed the Ministry of Public Security of China for five years. That agency is a domestic intelligence and counterintelligence service that ensures the protection of the political and state system, security of the senior leaders of the country, and supervises combat against terrorism and separatists. Analysts note that the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee also oversees public security issues in the country. Meng Jianzhu's mission is to maintain the social and political stability in the PRC.

Interestingly, the Chinese official met with Lukashenka almost immediately after his meeting with President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov (on 1 November). The day before, on 31 October, Meng Jianzhu visited the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and made extensive comments on the war on terror and extremism during his meeting with the staff of that agency.

Other noteworthy events during the period under review include the conferment of the Order of International Friendship on Colonel-General Xu Qiliang, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the PRC. We previously reported that Xu Qiliang supervises the Air Force and is mostly interested in Belarus because of the plans to deploy a Russian air base in the country. Incidentally, the report about the conferment of the order on the Chinese official was published on the same day that Lukashenka met with Meng Jianzhu.

The Order of International Friendship was also bestowed on the Russian entrepreneur Anatoly Ternavsky, whom the European Union considers to be a sponsor of the Lukashenka regime, and the Turkish entrepreneur Ali Riza Arslan.

Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič's visit to China, scheduled for December, never took place. There were no comments by the official media. We mentioned in the previous Index issue that Miasnikovič was supposed to formalize some of the bilateral agreements that were announced in September and October 2013.

The situation at the woodworking company OAO FanDOK, located in Babrujsk, should become a wake-up call for China. The Belarusian state media put a lot of the blame for the failure of a modernization project at the enterprise on a Chinese contractor.

Nevertheless, the period under review was filled with copy-book statements about the dynamic nature and significance of the Belarus-China relationship, which is somewhat impeded by some temporary difficulties, such as the lack of a roadmap for the development of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries or the insufficient development rate of the China-Belarus Industrial Park.

## Forecast for the near term

Given the increasing dependence of Belarus on Russian subsidies, the growing disappointment about China as a source of fast, easy and cheap money, as well as its role as an effective "pole" of the "push-pull" foreign policy, official Minsk will likely adopt a more moderate approach to its relationship with China.

The strong Chinese lobby in the Belarusian establishment will buffer the consequences of such a revision in the pattern of the bilateral relations, though. Being a powerful international player, China will be able to effectively assert its interests.

Nevertheless, one can expect that the heavily advertized Belarus-China projects will be gradually phased out from the media, the CBIP project will be promoted only verbally, and there will be no major financial injections from China.

# Developments in Belarus's relations with the "developing world"

(Asia, Africa, Latin America)

Summary index: + 14

Total positive points: +14

Total negative points: 0

+14

0

## Main trends

As of late 2013, Belarus's policy in the developing world was going through fundamental transformations

First, because of the intricate situation in the region and around it, Minsk has had to isolate itself from most of its partners in the Middle East, which resulted in a sharp reduction in the traditionally high share of that region in Belarus's foreign policy effort.

Second, the Belarusian government is consistently working on expanding contacts with the regions and countries that remained virtually undiscovered until quite recently — primarily in West Africa (Nigeria), East Africa (Ethiopia), South Africa (countries bordering on the RSA), South Asia (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh), and Southeast Asia (Indonesia). Contacts with traditional partners — India, Vietnam, Cuba and South Africa — are maintained (the Middle East became the only important exception).

Overall, Belarus's relationships in the developing world in 2013 can be grouped, based on their priority level, in the following way: Asia (India, Vietnam, the Arab monarchies, Turkey and — since quite recently — Indonesia), Latin America (Cuba, Venezuela and new partners — Ecuador and Bolivia), and Africa (South Africa and Nigeria).

When it comes to the trends that stood out during the final months of the year, Belarus keeps redirecting its efforts in the developing world. Some indications include the streamlining of the network of its foreign offices, specifically the planned opening of an embassy in Ecuador and Ethiopia and closure of the consulate in Rio de Janeiro in early autumn, de facto decision not to renew its direct presence in Iraq and possible shift of the focus of the Belarusian Embassy in Libya to neighboring Morocco.

Belarus is working hard to apply its Venezuela collaboration experience to neighboring countries in Latin America — Ecuador and Bolivia — and has made certain progress. Close contacts with Cuba remain in place; major projects with Venezuela are underway.

Minsk has virtually phased out its activities in the developing world which could enrage the West and instead seeks to further its relationships with the developing countries that are close to the West, or, more specifically, to the United States (Turkey and the UAE).

## Description of the main events

### South and Southeast Asia

**Myanmar.** Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Valiancin Rybakoŭ paid a visit to Myanmar on 31 October – 1 November 2013 to attend consultations between the Foreign Ministries and the first session of the Belarus-Myanmar Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Co-

operation. The participants addressed the progress in the implementation of the agreements reached during the official visit of Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič to Myanmar in December 2011. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the Ministries of Healthcare of Belarus and Myanmar.

**Vietnam.** Hanoi played host to consultations between the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Vietnam on 4-6 December 2013. The consultations focused on the regulatory framework for collaboration. The Belarusian delegation to Vietnam was led by Aliaksiej Panferaŭ, deputy head of the Multilateral Treaties Division with the Central Office of Treaty and Legal Affairs of the Foreign Ministry.

**Bangladesh.** A Belarusian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Valiancin Rybakoŭ paid a working visit to Bangladesh on 3-4 November 2013. During his stay in Bangladesh, the Belarusian official met with the minister of textiles and jute, deputy ministers of foreign affairs, agriculture, finance, local government division, rural development and cooperative division, fisheries and livestock, and science and technology of Bangladesh. The officials discussed efforts to implement the agreements reached during the official visits of Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič to Bangladesh in November 2012 and Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina to Belarus in July 2013.

**Pakistan.** Belarusian Ambassador to Iran with concurrent accreditation in Pakistan Viktor Rybak paid a working visit to the capital of Pakistan on 4-5 December 2013. Rybak met with the senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and Textile Industry, and held meetings in the Pakistani Senate. Rybak also met with the representatives of the diplomatic missions of the CIS member states accredited in Pakistan and held negotiations with representatives of Shahzad Links, the official dealer of Minsk Tractor Plant (MTZ) in Pakistan, Pakistan Guarantee Export Corporation Ltd. and other businessmen<sup>2</sup>. Pakistan is the only developing country with a substantial share of Belarusian export supplies, which were mostly formed by mechanical engineering products in 2012<sup>3</sup>.

**Engagement with Russia.** On 20 November 2013, Moscow hosted consultations between the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Russia centering on the engagement in the Asian region. The Belarusian delegation was led by Andrej Hrinkievič, head of the Division for Asia, Australia and Oceania of the Foreign Ministry, and Russia was represented by Bakhtiyor Khakimov, director of the Department for Asian and Pacific Cooperation of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The officials exchanged opinions on the situation in the Asia-Pacific Region, outlined priorities for further engagement in a broad range of issues associated with the collaboration with some of the countries of the region, primarily China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Australia<sup>4</sup>.

## Middle East

**Turkey.** Chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Cemil Cicek paid a visit to Belarus on 20-21 November 2013. A protocol of cooperation was signed between the National Assembly of Belarus and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Cicek met with Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič, who said that Belarus supported Turkey's proposal to renew the agreement on the mutual facilitation and protection of investments, which was

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2. О рабочем визите Посла Беларуси В.Рыбака в Пакистан 06.12.2013 [http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news\\_mfa/f7fd235063553a68.html](http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news_mfa/f7fd235063553a68.html)

3. Андрей Елисеев, С чем Беларусь выходит на рынки развивающихся стран, 17 снежня 2013, Naviny.by <http://news.tut.by/economics/379171.html>

4. О белорусско-российских межмидовских консультациях по вопросам взаимодействия в Азиатском регионе 20-11-2013 [http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news\\_mfa/f3c82461f640e0e9.html](http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news_mfa/f3c82461f640e0e9.html)

signed almost two decades ago. During the last five years, Turkish investments in Belarus expanded by more than 11 times. Two-way trade between Belarus and Turkey went up by 7.5 times during the last decade, to reach almost USD 500 million. On behalf of the Belarusian head of state, Miasnikovič once again extended an invitation for the Turkish president to visit Belarus<sup>5</sup>.

**Iraq.** In December 2013, former spokesman for the Belarusian Foreign Ministry Andrej Savinych was appointed Belarusian Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq. He made an optimistic statement about the prospects of restoring the relationship between Belarus and Iraq, saying: "Iraq restores after the war. There is a bad need for virtually everything there. Belarusian products are a great value for money, and there may be a very strong demand for them in Iraq. There are excellent opportunities for construction or restoration of the local productions. But we need to make allowance for the local environment and act with caution"<sup>6</sup>. However, the very fact that Minsk does not deem it necessary to reopen its Embassy in Baghdad (closed back in 2003) suggests that Belarus remains skeptical about the prospects of the development of its relations with Iraq (the ambassador will be quite busy promoting the relationship with Turkey and will hardly pay too much attention to Iraq). Therefore, when Aliaksandr Lukashenka said, when officially appointing Savinych, that Iraq "must not be treated as a make-weight added to the work with Turkey"<sup>7</sup>, he set the new ambassador an impossible task.

**UAE.** Viktor Lukashenka, the president's national security advisor, visited the United Arab Emirates on 2-4 November 2013. The nature of the visit remains unknown. According to official reports, he met with Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, United Arab Emirates's minister of interior and deputy prime minister. Viktor Lukashenka also attended the 2013 Formula 1 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix in his private capacity<sup>8</sup>.

**Morocco.** Belarusian Ambassador to Libya with concurrent accreditation in Morocco Anatol Sciepus made a working visit to Morocco on 14-15 December, where he met with representatives of the local authorities and the tourism organization, held talks with the president of the Agadir Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Services and chairman of the Union of Moroccan Pharmacists Abdurazak Mon-Faoti<sup>9</sup>. Because of the ongoing crisis in Libya, Belarus will be unable to restore its relationship with that country any time soon. In this context, it would be advisable to shift the focus of the diplomatic office in Tripoli to Morocco, a longstanding partner of Belarus in the region and the country, where Belarus had been planning to open its embassy in the first place. Another important area for Belarus's engagement in Maghreb is Algeria. The Embassy in Libya may be closed soon, only to be reopened in either Morocco or Algeria.

## Latin America

**Brazil.** Deputy Foreign Minister Aliaksandr Hurjanaŭ led a Belarusian delegation to Brazil on 9-16 November 2013. The delegation comprised representatives of MTZ, Belarusian Potash Company, BelAZ and Gomselmash. Political consultations were held, focusing on the bilateral, regional and multilateral agenda. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Brazil on further holding of political

5. Михаил Мясникович встретился с Джемилем Чичеком 21.11.2013 <http://government.by/ru/content/5324>

6. Андрей Савиных: Миллиард долларов товарооборота с Турцией - не предел, 11 снежня 2013, TUT.BY, <http://news.tut.by/economics/378148.html>

7. Лукашенко провел кадровые рокировки, направив сотрудников МИДа наращивать экспорт, TUT.BY, 3 снежня 2013 <http://news.tut.by/politics/377308.html>

8. Виктор Лукашенко провел переговоры в ОАЭ и посетил этап Формулы-1, TUT.BY, 10 лістапада 2013, <http://news.tut.by/politics/374157.html>

9. О рабочей поездке Посла Беларуси А.Степуся в Марокко 16-12-2013 [http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news\\_mfa/cf2e17e6b674bbab.html](http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news_mfa/cf2e17e6b674bbab.html)

consultations on a regular basis. Business meetings were held with representatives of the authorities and business communities of the states of Parana, Pará and São Paulo.

The delegation emphasized the implementation of the project to create an assembly facility of Belarusian tractors in Brazil and establishment of cooperation with a view to promoting supplies of Belarusian potash fertilizers to the region. An agreement was signed between Belarus and Brazil abolishing visas for short-term trips of their citizens.

**Bolivia.** The first session of the joint Belarusian-Bolivian Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation was held in Minsk on 21-22 November 2013. Belarus was represented by Chief of the Presidential Property Management Directorate Viktor Šejman, and leading the Bolivian delegation was Juan Ramon Quintana Taborga, Minister of Presidency of Bolivia. The commission addressed the status and prospects of the promotion of cooperation in industry, agriculture, construction, mining, R&D, education and other areas. The Bolivian delegation visited the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Architecture and Construction, National Academy of Sciences, and MTZ. The session was aimed to facilitate the implementation of the agreements that were reached during the visit of Bolivian President Evo Morales to Belarus in September 2013.

**Ecuador.** Vice-President of Ecuador Jorge Glas Espinel paid a visit to Belarus on 15-16 December 2013. In late October 2013, the president of Ecuador visited Belarus. As he met with the top Ecuadorean official, Lukashenka said: "We came to agreement with the president concerning approximately 15 areas of cooperation between Ecuador and Belarus. We have a rich experience of collaboration of this kind with Venezuela. You can always take a look at the situation there and if those areas for cooperation suit you (and the president said they were acceptable for Ecuador), we can collaborate to create joint productions in Ecuador at the same pace".

Lukashenka noted that Belarus was ready to pursue collaboration with Ecuador in any area with no restrictions: "We are ready to cooperate, starting from agriculture and all the way to the military and technical sector"<sup>10</sup>. In late December 2013, IHS Jane's Defence Industry reported with reference to BelTA<sup>11</sup> that Belarus and Ecuador were planning to collaborate on unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development<sup>12</sup>. A bit earlier, on 19 November, the Belarusian government made a decision to open an embassy in Ecuador in 2014.

**Venezuela.** The Second Venezuela-Belarus Forum "Achievements and Prospects of Bilateral Relations between Belarus and Venezuela" was held in Minsk on 27 November 2013. Commenting on its results, First Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir Siamaška said that the "capacity of the MAZ and MTZ truck and tractor assembling facilities in Venezuela is comparable to that of the Belarusian production facilities". Specifically, the truck and tractor assembling facilities built in the state of Barinas are capable of making up to 20,000 tractors and 10,000 trucks annually, provided they operate on a dual shift basis. Siamaška also spoke about the plans for Belarusian contractors to build 2,000 more apartments in that Venezuelan state and the possible construction of a major oil refinery and a combined heat and power plant in Barinas. Siamaška said, quite optimistically: "We will collaborate in all areas, from agriculture to space technologies"<sup>13</sup>.

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10. Lukashenka: Belarus reaches a new level of cooperation with the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin American and the Middle East TUT.BY, 16 December 2013, <http://news.tut.by/politics/379059.html>

11. Belarus and Ecuador plan to create a joint laboratory to develop unmanned aerial vehicles, 17 December 2013, [http://www.belta.by/ru/all\\_news/society/Belarus-i-Ekvador-planirujut-sozdat-sovmestnuju-laboratoriju-po-razrabotke-bespilotnikov\\_i\\_655045.html](http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/society/Belarus-i-Ekvador-planirujut-sozdat-sovmestnuju-laboratoriju-po-razrabotke-bespilotnikov_i_655045.html)

12. Belarus and Ecuador to collaborate on UAV development Matthew Smith, Correspondent, London - IHS Jane's Defence Industry, 22 December 2013, <http://www.janes.com/article/31896/belarus-and-ecuador-to-collaborate-on-uav-development>

13. Second Venezuela-Belarus Forum "Achievements and Prospects of Bilateral Relations between Belarus and Venezuela" is held on 27 November, <http://venezuela.mfa.gov.by/print/ru/embassy/news/d9bdaa1ffef8448a.html>

## Africa

**West Africa.** A Belarusian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Valiancin Rybakoŭ paid a visit to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea on 12-15 November 2013. The foreign ministers of the two African countries received invitations on behalf of Belarusian Foreign Minister Makiej to visit Belarus. Rybakoŭ's visit is expected to help organize the operation of the Belarusian Embassy in Nigeria, which also supervises Belarus's relationships with Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. However, neither has enough potential to become a serious trade partner of Belarus (unlike neighboring Ghana, Cameroon or Senegal, let alone Nigeria) because of scarcity of finance and small size. The population of Gabon is estimated at 1.6 million people, and only 700,000 people live in Equatorial Guinea.

In November, Belarusian Ambassador to Nigeria with concurrent accreditation in some of the neighboring countries Viačaslau Beskostyj submitted his credentials to the President of Gambia Yahya Jammeh and President of Togo Essozimna Gnassingbé.

**South Africa.** Minsk played host to the third session of the Joint Belarus-South Africa Committee on Trade and Economic Cooperation on 21 November 2013.

The Belarusian side was headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakoŭ, and the South African delegation was led by Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa Elizabeth Thabethe. The officials addressed prospects of engagement in industrial production, agriculture and education. The possibility of creating assembling facilities to produce Belarusian tractors, trucks and other wheeled machinery in South Africa became an independent issue on the agenda. Rybakoŭ and Thabethe participated in the opening of the Belarusian-South African Business Forum.

**Ethiopia.** In early December 2013, Deputy Director of the Department for Foreign Economic Activities of the Foreign Ministry Zmicier Kupciel was appointed Belarusian Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative of Belarus in the African Union. This means the work on the opening of an embassy in Addis Ababa has been completed. Belarus had been trying to approach the markets of East Africa long enough; however, its attempts had been thwarted because of Minsk's old conflict with the autocratic regime of the Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi. The relationship between the two countries was reanimated only after Zenawi's death in autumn 2012.

## Forecast for the near term

The year 2014 will likely see methodical efforts of official Minsk to further its collaboration primarily with Latin American countries, where it plans to apply its Venezuelan experience to new partners — Bolivia and Ecuador. Belarus will keep working hard to have a stronger footing in the new markets of South and Southeast Asia (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Indonesia). Problems in the Middle East will likely persist, and although Minsk will continue promoting its relationships with the Arab monarchies and Turkey, its efforts will be somewhat limited because of the difficult situation in the region. The country will keep working in Africa and will probably be most active in contacts with the new partners — Nigeria, Ghana, and Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola.

The contacts with the traditional partners in the region are beyond recovery. The economic ties with Iran will remain, but since Teheran will hardly be able to come to terms with the West any time soon, Minsk will try to avoid political contacts and the most challenging economic projects. The relations with the other traditional partners in the Middle East — Syria, Iraq, Libya and Egypt — will not be mended in the near future.

Given the recent changes in the global political landscape and trends in the country's foreign contacts, Belarus will probably continue streamlining the network of its foreign offices. It is quite likely that Minsk will choose to close its Embassy in Libya and open it in either Morocco or Algeria. The Embassy in Argentina may be closed as well (its economic performance has been very poor for many years), especially now that Belarus has decided to open its embassy in Ecuador.

Overall, Minsk's policy on the developing world will be guided exclusively by the country's economic interests, the key goal being to boost export supplies, especially mechanical engineering products (the situation with foreign sales of fertilizers looks a lot better). Trade with the developing world is perceived as an instrument to make up for the deficit in trade with other countries. The Belarusian government demonstrates its unwillingness to take any action in the developing world that can irritate the West — this trend will remain in place in 2014. It does not mean that Minsk will give up on its military and technical cooperation contacts (which it considers to be a legitimate portion of its relations with the developing nations), but it means that there is no reason to expect that Belarus will be taking risks in this matter.



# Developments in Belarus-Ukraine relations

Summary index: +4

Total positive points: +5

Total negative points: -1

+5

-1

## Main trends

During the period under review, the relationship with Belarus was quite low on the list of Ukraine's foreign policy priorities. In November, the Ukrainian leadership was focused on the preparations for the Vilnius EaP Summit and semi-official consultations between Viktor Yanukovich and Russian President Vladimir Putin. In December, the Ukrainian authorities were busy dealing with the mass protests in Kyiv.

In early November, the Belarusian administration showed its full support for Ukraine's European integration ambition. Apparently, Aliaksandr Lukashenka had expected that the upcoming changes in the geopolitical environment in Eastern Europe will open up new exciting opportunities. However, the frustration of Ukraine's Association Agreement with the European Union made official Minsk change its plans.

Lukashenko now has a very serious competitor for Russian resources. Ukraine's giving up on its original integration plans considerably narrows the room for official Minsk to maneuver in its geopolitical drift between Europe and Russia.

In November and December 2013, the two countries avoided any new serious commercial conflicts, but no progress in two-way trade was made, either. No serious plans concerning trade relations were announced.

## Description of the main events

In the first half of November 2013, Lukashenka openly showed his support for Ukraine's commitment to European integration, despite the extremely negative attitude of the Kremlin to this possibility. Lukashenka's positive attitude to Ukraine's endeavor was extensively broadcast by the official Belarusian media.

In this context, the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council made quite a meaningful decision at the level of heads of state on 15 November, enabling each Customs Union member state to independently decide on imposing safeguard measures on Ukraine if it signed a Free Trade Area (FTA) agreement with the European Union. In other words, Belarus and Kazakhstan de facto refused to introduce joint economic measures that could have put Ukraine under economic pressure.

Ukraine's European integration efforts were discussed during a meeting between Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and his Belarusian counterpart Michail Miasnikovič in St. Petersburg on 20 November.

Throughout the entire period in question, traditional trade conflicts remained in place for the most sensitive groups of commodities. However, those conflicts almost never reached the broad public. Belarus is getting more and more irritated at the rapidly growing export of Ukrainian beer, whereas Ukraine is dissatisfied with the increasing deliveries of Belarusian-made dairy products. Illegal dairy supplies from Belarus are twice or even thrice



as large as the volume of official import from Belarus, the National Association of Milk Producers of Ukraine insists.

In December, the media reported citing unofficial sources that the Ministry of Agrarian Policy of Ukraine and Belarus's Belgospischeprom food concern were planning to monitor the prices of dairy products imported from Belarus in Ukraine and of Ukrainian beer delivered to Belarus. After this information was analyzed, a statement was made that a "certain fundamental decision" could be made envisaging mutual restrictions on the volume of export of both beer and dairy products.

At the official level, the two countries showed complete understanding and spoke about their willingness to promote collaboration in trade and production cooperation. The issue was addressed, among others, by Anatoliy Maksyuta, Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Economic Development, and First Deputy Industry Minister of Belarus Ivan Dziemidovič at their meeting in November. They also discussed the implementation of the "roadmap" for the development of bilateral cooperation for 2013-2015, which was signed by the Ukrainian and Belarusian premiers in October.

Active demarcation of the Belarusian-Ukrainian state border was underway during the period under review. Kyiv played host to the second session of the Joint Belarusian-Ukrainian Demarcation Commission on 5-7 November, which addressed a range of issues in its jurisdiction, including the opening of the first border sign on the Belarusian-Ukrainian state border.

The first border sign was solemnly unveiled on the state border in the Chernihiv Region on 14 November. The ceremony was attended by Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and Belarus Leonid Kozhara and Uladzimir Makiej. On 19 November, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yevgeny Perebiynis said that Belarus and Ukraine would request the European Union to renew financing of the project to demarcate the state border amounting to EUR 17.5 million.

On 12 November, Kyiv hosted the fourth meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Commission for Cooperation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus. The commission mostly focused on trade and economic cooperation.

## Forecast for the near term

As we mentioned previously, the relationship between official Minsk and official Kyiv has never been strategic or systemic. The ups and downs were for the most part a result of external developments and were used as a sort of "bargaining chip" in the framework of the two countries' relationships with stronger geopolitical players.

Official Minsk's hopes of a long and hard "war" between the Kremlin, official Kyiv and the European Union never came true. Now that Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin have reached essential agreements, one can expect new conflicts between Kyiv and Minsk, which have turned into direct competitors for Russian resources.

One can also expect tensions concerning the traditionally sensitive issue of Belarusian import of oil products in Ukraine. According to unofficial sources, during their December talks, Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin reached an agreement on the sale of Lisichansk Refinery by Russian oil major Rosneft to the oligarchic "family" clan (led by President Yanukovych's elder son Oleksandr) and resumption of Russian crude deliveries to Lisichansk and Odessa Refineries (the latter is already owned by the oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko, who is close to the "Family").

This suggests that the Ukrainian authorities may very soon make an attempt to limit the import of Belarusian gasoline in Ukraine, which will trigger conflicts in all segments of two-way trade.

## Annex

### Catalogue of events underlying the relations development index

## Belarus-Russia relations

Date	Event	Point
9 November	Days of Spiritual Culture of Russia in Belarus	+1
11 November	A. Lukashenka meets with Head of the Republic of Karelia A. Khudilainen	+3
19 November	Joint board meeting of the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Russia	+1
19 November	Belarusian delegation led by P. Prakapovič visits the Kaliningrad Region	+2
20 November	Consultations between the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Russia on the engagement in the Asian region	+1
20 November	M. Miasnikovič meets with D. Medvedev. They discuss oil product duties	+2
22 November	Belarusian Ambassador to Russia I. Pietryšenka meets with Governor of the Omsk Region V. Nazarov	+1
25 November	A. Lukashenka meets with Governor of the Bryansk Region N. Denin	+2
27 November	M. Miasnikovič meets with Director of the Federal Space Agency of Russia O. Ostapenko	+2
28 November	U. Siamaška and Deputy Prime Minister of Russia A. Dvorkovich discuss oil and oil product supplies in 2013-2014. U. Siamaška and S. Kiriyenko discuss the construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant project	+2
29 November	Belarusian Ambassador to Russia I. Pietryšenka meets with First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia V. Titov	+1
5 December	A. Lukashenka meets with State Secretary of the Union State of Belarus and Russia G. Rapota. M. Miasnikovič meets with G. Rapota	+3
10 December	Russian Air Force Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker fighter jets arrive at the air field of the 61st fighter air base of the Air Force and Air Defense of Belarus	+2
13 December	M. Miasnikovič participates in a meeting of the Union State Council of Ministers	+1
16 December	A. Lukashenka has a telephone conversation with V. Putin	+1
18 December	A. Lukashenka pays a working visit to the Russian Federation	+3
18 December	45th session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. U. Andrejčanka meets with S. Naryshkin	+1

№ 17 November-December 2013

Date	Event	Point
18 December	Agreement is reached to sell a shareholding in OAO Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant to a Russian investor	+2
19 December	Supervisory board of Vnesheconombank, Russia, approves decision to participate in the financing of the project to build the Belarusian nuclear power plant and earmarks USD500 million	+1
19 December	Senior officials of the Belneftekhim concern and the Russian Energy Ministry confirm the possibility of supplying 23 million tons of crude oil to Belarusian oil refineries in 2014	+1
24 December	Belarusian Ambassador to Russia I. Pietryshenka meets with Chairperson of the Russian Audit Chamber T. Golikova	+1
24-25 December	Meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and Supreme State Council of the Union State	+3
27 December	Russia will consider supplying 23 million tons of crude oil to Belarus in 2014, says Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to Belarus Alexander Surikov	+1
28 December	Metropolitan Pavel is approved as Metropolitan of Minsk and Slutsk, the Patriarch Exarch of Belarus	+1
December 2013	Delay in the provision of the 6th installment of the EurAsEC ACF loan as Belarus fails to meet its obligations	-2
<b>Total</b>		<b>+37</b>

## Belarus-EU relations

Date	Event	Point
12-13 November	European Regional Belarusian-Polish Economic Forum Hajnowka 2013	+1
12 November	Uladzimir Makiej meets with Ambassador of Spain Jose Ignacio Carbajal Garate	+1
13-14 November	Representatives of official Minsk participate in the meetings of the Eastern Partnership working group on science and innovation and Platform 4 "Contacts between people"	+1
15 November	Uladzimir Makiej meets with Ambassador of Slovenia Primož Šeligo	+1
25-26 November	Meeting of the Belarusian-Slovak joint commission for trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation in Bratislava with the participation of Deputy Foreign Minister Aliaksandr Hurjanaŭ	+1
25 November	Uladzimir Makiej meets with Ambassador of Italy Arnaldo Abeti	+1
26-29 November	Delegation of Belarus led by Aliaksandr Hurjanaŭ visits France	+1
28 November	Belarusian Economy Minister Mikalaj Snapkoŭ participates in the 2nd Eastern Partnership Business Forum in Vilnius	+2
28-29 November	Belarusian delegation led by Uladzimir Makiej participates in the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius; Makiej makes a statement about Belarus's willingness to negotiate visa facilitation with the EU	+3
2 December	Uladzimir Makiej meets with Ambassador of France Dominique Gazuy	+1
6 December	Aliaksandr Hurjanaŭ meets with Ambassador of Poland Leszek Szerepka	+1
10 December	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Ambassador of Poland Leszek Szerepka	+1
10 December	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Ambassador of Germany Wolfram Maas	+1
12-13 December	Meeting of the Intergovernmental Belarusian-Slovenian commission for trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation in Minsk, attended by Aliena Kupčyna	+1
12-13 December	Aliaksandr Hurjanaŭ visits Poland	+1
16 December	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Ambassador of the Netherlands Paul Bekkers	+1
17 December	Uladzimir Makiej meets with ambassadors of the EU member states, United States and Vatican	+1
19 December	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Ambassador of Lithuania Evaldas Ignatavicius	+1
20 December	Signing of the Agreement on the financing of the project "Mobility Scheme for Targeted People-to-People Contacts" (MOST) between Belarus and the European Commission in the framework of the Annual Action Programme for Belarus	+1
<b>Total</b>		<b>+22</b>

## Belarus-China relations

Date	Event	Point
1 November	A. Lukashenka confers the Order of International Friendship on Colonel-General Xu Qiliang, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the PRC	+1
1 November	A. Lukashenka meets with Meng Jianzhu, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee	+3
5 December	A. Lukashenka meets with Ambassador of China to Belarus Gong Jianwei in connection with the completion of his diplomatic mission. Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič also meets with the ambassador	+2
9 December	Uladzimir Makiej meets with Ambassador of China to Belarus Gong Jianwei in connection with the completion of his diplomatic mission	+1
11 December	Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus Anatol Tozik meets with senior executives of Huawei	+1
11 December	Belarus and China should have closer ties in the banking sector, Ambassador of China to Belarus Gong Jianwei says during his meeting with the Chairman of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus Anatol Rubinaŭ	+1
20 December	Internal infrastructure of the China-Belarus Industrial Park is to be completed in 2014, says Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus P. Prakapovič	+1
29 December	Brest Region and the Chinese Province of Hubei, which established twin-region relations, signed a cooperation plan for 2014-2020	+1
<b>Total</b>		<b>+11</b>

## Belarus's relations with the "developing world"

Date	Event	Point
31 October – 1 November	Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakoŭ pays a visit to Myanmar	+1
2-4 November	President's national security aide V. Lukashenka visits the United Arab Emirates	+1
3–4 November	Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakoŭ pays a working visit to Bangladesh	+1
9–16 November	Delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Hurjanaŭ visits Brazil	+1
12–13 November	Delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakoŭ visits Gabon	+1
14–15 November	Delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakoŭ visits Equatorial Guinea	+1
20-21 November	Chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Cemil Cicek pays a visit to Belarus	+2
20-21 November	Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa Elizabeth Thabethe visits Belarus	+1
21 – 22 November	Minister of Presidency of Bolivia Juan Ramon Quintana Taborga visits Belarus	+2
4-6 December	Deputy head of the Multilateral Treaties Division Aliaksiej Panferaŭ visits Vietnam	+1
15-16 December	Vice-President of Ecuador Jorge Glas Espinel pays a visit to Belarus	+2
<b>Total</b>		<b>+14</b>

## Belarus-Ukraine relations

Date	Event	Point
First half of November	As opposed to the Kremlin's policy, President A. Lukashenka demonstrates his support for Ukraine's prospects of European integration. Belarus abstains from joint restrictive measures against Ukrainian products in the framework of the Customs Union	+2
5-7 November	Kyiv plays host to the second session of the Joint Belarusian-Ukrainian Demarcation Commission, which decides, among other issues, on the opening of the first border sign on the Belarusian-Ukrainian state border. Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej attends the ceremony of unveiling the sign on 14 November	+1
12 November	Kyiv hosts the fourth meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Commission for Cooperation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus	+1
November- December	Two-way trade volumes drop, export of Belarusian oil products to Ukraine, which make up the bulk of Belarusian export supplies to that country, shrink by more than a third	-1
<b>Total</b>		<b>+4</b>

## Event ranking scale:

- Economic and political integration, creation of customs unions, common markets, supranational bodies (ratification and coming into effect of relevant treaties) – **5-7 points**
- Signing/ratification of a crucial agreement (on cooperation, trade, tariffs, visa-free travel, etc., signing of documents on integration) – **4 points**
- Top-level official visit (president and premier) and bilateral meetings – **3 points**
- Large-scale interstate contract, loan arrangement, provision of economic aid – **3 points**
- Official visit at the level of a minister (key ministers: foreign minister, interior minister, defense minister, economy minister, finance minister, trade minister) and head of the presidential administration; contract negotiations – **2 points**
- Official visit at the level of a deputy minister (and non-key ministers), a parliamentary delegation, exhibition, business forum, days of national culture, important diplomatic contacts and negotiations – **1 point**
- Positive statements by the president, Belarusian Foreign Ministry, parliamentary resolutions, positive materials in state or state-controlled media (monitored media include Sovetskaya Belorussia, BelTA, Zviazda, Belarusian Television – 1st National Channel, 2nd National Channel) – **1 point**
- Adverse statements by the president, Belarusian Foreign Ministry, media, adverse parliamentary resolutions, negative materials in the state media – **minus 1 point**
- Protraction of ratification of treaties, non-invitation to events, failure to provide support internationally – **minus 2 points**
- Infringement of treaties, default on mutual commitments (by the Belarusian side) – **minus 3 points**
- Trade wars, antidumping investigations – **minus 3 points**
- Commodity boycotts, embargoes, recall of diplomats, ambassadors – **minus 4 points**
- Severance of diplomatic relations, provocations, military operations – **minus 5-7 points**