



Belarus' FOREIGN POLICY INDEX

No.16 September-October 2013

Dear readers,

We are pleased to present the sixteenth issue of Belarus' Foreign Policy Index, a publication that provides a comprehensive analysis of developments in five areas of Belarus's foreign policy in September and October 2013. It is also our pleasure to inform you that starting this issue we will prepare a special **"Foreign Policy Accent"** supplement to the Index. The first Accent focuses on the analysis of drastic changes in Belarus's foreign policy efforts in the Middle East. From now on we will be offering in-depth analyses of the aspects and areas of Belarus's foreign policy that are worth close attention.

As for the sixteenth issue of Belarus' Foreign Policy Index, **the most significant modification recorded in September and October is a surge in contacts with Russia amid symmetrical curtailment of contacts with China.** As in our previous Index issue, all of the country's foreign policy vectors are in the positive territory.

The intensification of two major integration projects — those European and Eurasian — and aggravating economic situation have revived the "pendulum" foreign policy pursued by official Minsk. However, Russia will not fall for these diplomatic tricks and seems to have been adopting Belarus's trademark negotiating style in its relationship with the western ally, as it demands real concessions in exchange for integration promises in the near future.

Active diplomatic contacts with the countries and institutions of the **European Union** are still there; however, the number of contacts is never transformed into a better quality of the bilateral relationship. Minsk still focuses its efforts on the work with separate EU member states. This trend is a reflection of the policy to promote the country's interests via the countries that have the least critical position on Belarus.

The Belarus issue at the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit will likely have a low profile, as all eyes will be on the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. At the summit, Belarus will probably be represented by Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej, although the decision will likely be made at the very last moment.

Of all the troublesome issues in Belarus's relationship with **China** that were outlined in previous Index issues, none were close to resolution during the period under review. At the same time, the complicated economic situation in Belarus makes it necessary that the authorities give the results of collaboration with China a more thorough analysis. Apparently, in a few months to come, the Belarusian authorities will increase their pressure on the Chinese partners in order to tackle the current economic problems. However, China will hardly offer Belarus any serious financial injections.

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9 China

12 "Developing world"

17 Ukraine

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Belarus is tacitly adapting its foreign policy in **the developing world** to the reality of the unipolar world, the examples being the minimization of its relations with Iran and Syria and intensification of contacts with the Arab monarchies and Turkey.

An important achievement is the successful development of relationships with the extremely promising countries of South and Southeast Asia. New partners are added to old ones in this region, rather than replace them. Belarus's foreign policy priority list in the developing world will look as follows in the short term: Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, the south of Africa. Moves to further enhance contacts in the South African region will be very likely.

During the two months under review, the relationship between Belarus and **Ukraine** at the top political level became markedly more active. A. Lukashenka have been commenting on the issue of Ukraine's European integration on a regular basis; against the backdrop of the Kremlin's aggressive rhetoric, the stance on Ukraine adopted by the Belarusian head of state looks as non-judgmental and conciliatory as it gets.

The two countries avoided new trade conflicts in the two months in question. At the same time, no significant achievements in the bilateral trade and economic relations can be mentioned.



Objectively, Ukraine and Belarus remain rivals in various areas; therefore, it is improbable that the two countries and their leaders will seek strategic partnership relations in the foreseeable future.

We wish you a pleasant reading and invite you to share your comments and opinions.

Dzianis Melyantsou

Belarus Foreign Policy Index Editor

Relations development indices:



Developments in Belarus-Russia relations

+42



-8

Summary index: +34

Total positive points: +42

Total negative points: -8

Main trends

In September and October 2013, official Minsk's search for additional opportunities to have the Kremlin shore up the Belarusian economy became the main trend in the bilateral relationship.

This policy became a possibility as two major integration projects — those European and Eurasian — enjoyed a higher profile amid the attempts by the Belarusian authorities to re-employ the "pendulum" pattern of its foreign policy. Belarus's deteriorating economy became a powerful impetus to these activities by official Minsk.

Although the ongoing political cycle is far from completion, it is safe to say that the Belarusian side failed: Russia shows admirable tenacity and does not respond to provocations.

In its relations with Belarus, Russia seems to be adopting Belarus's trademark style, namely, the demand of real concessions in exchange for promises of a deeper and beneficial integration in the near future.

Description of the main events

During the period in question, official Minsk was making determined attempts to get Russia to maximize its financial support for Belarus. The main factor in this game was the Kremlin's reluctance to strain its relations with the western ally amid the preparation for and holding of the meeting of the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS and, even more importantly, the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. To attain its objectives (to have all of the regulatory exceptions in the Common Economic Space (CES) abolished, take new loans and have previous ones refinanced, and resuscitate the old "grey" trade schemes), the Belarusian authorities went to great lengths: the arrest of Vladislav Baumgertner, defamation of the former economic partners, including the demands that the Russian administration should replace their owner (Uralkali) and active negotiations with the Russian economic establishment over special terms for the Belarusian partners.

These actions by the Belarusian side caused a lukewarm response by the Kremlin. It can be assumed that now that attention is focused more on the Eastern Partnership (ahead of the Vilnius summit) and the Eurasian Union, whose outlines are supposed to become sharp and clear by 2015, the Belarusian authorities have decided to probe their partners for additional concessions and preferences.

However, even though many meetings were arranged, negotiations were held and statements were made, official Minsk never succeeded in having any substantial concessions in the supplies of Russian crude. It is expected that in January-December 2013, Belarus will have imported 21 million tons of oil, which is more than the maximum amount originally announced by the Russian side (18.5 million tons), but less than the amount voiced by the Belarusian side (23 million tons). By all appearances, crude oil will be delivered to Belarus in 2014 based on the same scenario, as there are no indications that Russia is ready to sign an annual oil balance meeting Belarus's requirement of 23 million tons,

whereas the quarterly balances provide Moscow with a more effective instruments to control the obstinate western ally.

Nevertheless, some changes in the oil sector were recorded during the period under review, although they do not indicate any progress in Belarus's relationship with Russia, either. Apparently, Igor Sechin discussed the sale of the state stake in OAO Mozyr NPZ oil refinery to Russia's oil major OAO NK Rosneft during his most recent visit to Belarus. Naturally, given the specific business environment in Belarus, one can never be sure about the decision or its outcomes, but Sechin insured his interests, including by making a contract with Belneftekhim concern on 16 September for crude oil deliveries to the Belarusian oil refineries by the end of 2013, as well as in 2014. It should be noted, though, that Sechin's main objective is to force his main rivals — Lukoil and Tatneft — to the background and have his oil business exempted from duties; after that, he will handle the asset ownership issue.

The second most significant development in the oil sector is associated with Vladimir Putin's notorious statement in the course of the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council concerning the complete abolition of all exceptions by 2015. The Russian side is known for having been making statements of this kind; however, it meticulously outlined the terms and conditions for the cancellation of the regulatory exceptions, namely, the compliance of its partners with all of their current commitments. The new pledge of the Russian president sparked a wave of euphoria in the Belarusian establishment, perplexed the automotive industry (the amount of the recycling tax on vehicles and procedure to pay the tax are determined at the sole discretion of the Russian side) and enraged the entrepreneurs, who have been forced to meet the requirements of the Customs Union technical regulation starting 1 December 2013.

During the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the state leaders of Belarus and Kazakhstan voiced concerted criticism of the integration process promoted by Russia. The main complaint against the integration policy pursued by the Russian side was its attempt to seek deeper integration and create its political dimension without properly implementing the existing agreements in the framework of the free trade area and the customs union of the three countries. Lukashenka spoke against the introduction of the single currency and creation of a political superstructure of the union, while Nazarbayev criticized non-tariff limitations within the troika.

Neither September nor October saw Russia make any concessions in the framework of the "potash" scandal. The agreement on the restructuring of Sberbank of Russia's USD 1 billion loan to OAO Belaruskali was predictable and is apparently associated with the interests of big Russian business in this sector rather than Baumgartner's arrest.

Forecast for the near term

As long as Belarus keeps maneuvering between Moscow, Brussels and Beijing, it is highly unlikely that it will enjoy any new significant concessions from Russia. The Russian authorities have been making it quite clear that its possible support will remain at a minimum level ensuring the survival of the Belarusian economy. However, this support comes with a price: Belarus will pay by being involved in integration projects.

The attempts by the Belarusian authorities to procure special integration conditions will gradually come to naught. In expectation of the cancellation of regulatory exceptions of official Minsk progressively yields to the eastern ally's pressure.

Ahead of the Vilnius Eastern Partnership summit, the next few weeks will likely see the peak of attempts to reanimate the "pendulum" foreign policy pattern and make Russia look like a "colonizer with imperial ambitions".

Developments in Belarus-EU relations

+24



-1

Summary index: +23

Total positive points: +24

Total negative points: -1

Main trends

Active diplomatic contacts between senior officials at the Belarusian Foreign Ministry and heads of the EU diplomatic missions and institutions continued throughout September and October, and so did the contacts between the Belarusian diplomats stationed in the EU and the European authorities. However, there is no saying that the number of contacts automatically translates into quality improvements for the bilateral relationship.

The Belarusian authorities drag out the resolution of the issue of political prisoners, something that EU officials have expected from Belarus ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. Unless the issue is resolved, there is no chance the relationship will enter a new quality phase or a new bilateral agenda will be formed.

Minsk keeps focusing its efforts on separate EU member states. This trend is manifested in especially active and intense contacts between the Belarusian side and Hungary, Italy, Germany, France, Lithuania and Latvia, reflecting the willingness of official Minsk to assert its interests via the countries that have adopted the least critical positions on Belarus.

Description of the main events

The breakthrough in the relationship between Belarus and EU following summer vacations that was in the previous Index issue's forecast did not materialize in September and October, despite the fact that the period under review was filled with numerous working contacts between Belarusian diplomats and officials representing the EU member states and institutions. In previous months, such contacts mostly took the form of meetings between senior officials at the Belarusian Foreign Ministry and heads of diplomatic missions of the EU countries and institutions to Minsk; whereas in more recent periods, there were more visits to the EU by Belarusian officials.

The period under review was marked by two important events. First of all, Lithuanian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrius Krivas handed invitations to the November Eastern Partnership summit in Lithuania over to the heads of the diplomatic missions of all of the EaP member states in Vilnius on 15 October. The invitations were not addressed to a specific official, though, but to an entire country, according to the press service of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry.

A few days later, Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej said that Belarus's participation in the EaP summit in Vilnius was an open question: "*Keep an eye on the news, we'll make an announcement*", the minister said. It looks like the chilly tone of the bilateral relationship will prompt official Minsk to take and voice its decision on the level of participation in the summit at the very last moment.

Secondly, on 29 October, the European Union extended for another year restrictive measures against Belarus, although the list of persons and companies subject to restrictions has been modified: 13 names and five businesses have been crossed out, while

three new names appeared on the list¹. The Foreign Ministry predictably treated the shortening of the list as a constructive move; however, the very fact that the restrictions were extended was condemned and dubbed counterproductive.

Deputy Foreign Minister Aliena Kupčyna remained the central figure in Belarus's foreign policy as far as the European Union was concerned. She had four meetings with the heads of diplomatic missions accredited in Minsk and four more meetings with high-ranking diplomats representing the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Sweden and the European External Action Service. Kupčyna also made a few quite remarkable foreign visits.

She paid a visit to Latvia on 6-7 September to attend the Riga Conference and held a series of bilateral meetings with the participants in the conference and Latvian officials. On 9 September, she visited the United Kingdom to meet with representatives of the British Foreign Office. Finally, on 8 October, Kupčyna paid a visit to Hungary where she was received by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. That visit was especially important, as it was not her first working visit to Hungary during the past 12 months. It cannot be ruled out that the active contacts with Hungary are due to Kupčyna's personal connections (she was Belarus's ambassador to that country in 2006-2012) and warmer relations between the administrations of the two countries as against the general tonality of the EU policy on Belarus.

In the meantime, the period under review was marked by the involvement of two more Uladzimir Makiej's deputies in the campaign to improve relations with the EU: Aliaksandr Michnievič (first deputy minister) and Aliaksandr Hurianaŭ. The two were less active in the European sector (it is Kupčyna that supervises Belarus's relationship with Europe), though. Specifically, Hurianaŭ paid three visits to the EU: to Austria, Latvia and Germany. In Vienna and Riga, he had meetings with high-ranking officials of Foreign Ministries, and in Germany, he took part (along with Siarhej Rumas, chairman of the board of OAO Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus and Deputy Economy Minister Anton Kudasaŭ) in the Day of Belarusian Economy in Berlin.

On 12-13 September, Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej participated in a regular meeting of the foreign ministers of the Eastern Partnership member states. The meeting was held as part of the third round of informal ministerial dialogues in Yerevan. Makiej made a series of traditional statements concerning the importance of honoring the principle of equality in the Eastern Partnership, as well as the need to increase the practical return on the initiative through promoting business cooperation and joint projects in transport, trade, energy and border management. In Yerevan, Makiej had a bilateral meeting with European Commissioner Štefan Füle and Deputy Secretary General for the External Action Service Helga Schmidt. However, it became clear from subsequent developments that no breakthrough agreements had been reached in Yerevan, although the very fact that Belarus took part in the dialogues at the level of ministers is a positive indication.

The unusual activity of Ambassador to Russia Ihar Pietryšenka in the European sector became a somewhat peculiar feature of the period under review: while in Moscow, he held meetings with the ambassadors of Latvia and Slovenia to Russia (the latter has a concurrent accreditation in Belarus) in October.

Two-way trade between Belarus and the European Union member states totaled USD 15.9 billion in January-September 2013, a reduction by 25.1% year-on-year. Belarusian export reached USD 8.3 billion, a fall by 44% from the first nine months of 2012. Import from the EU amounted to USD 7.6 billion, an increase by 18.3% year-on-year. Two-way trade came to a surplus of USD 665.8 million for Belarus.

1 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1054/2013 of 29 October 2013 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus - <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2013%3A288%3ASOM%3AEN%3AHTML>

Forecast for the near term

With the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius topping the agenda for diplomats and general public alike, the issue of Belarus will remain inconspicuous, because the problem of political prisoners remains undecided. Central on the summit agenda will be EU's relationships, especially that with Ukraine. Based on this, no breakthroughs should be expected in Belarus-EU relations in the next few months.

The resolution of the problem of political prisoners will call for more complex and lengthy negotiations than it was planned just a few months ago. Official Minsk made it clear at a meeting with the political directors of the Polish and Swedish Foreign Ministries on 24 October that progress in this issue is only possible if the political prisoners address petitions for mercy to the president. It looks like the Belarusian authorities will stick to this position; at least until they realize that specific material benefits will be in store for them if they expedite the resolution of the problem.

When it comes to the level of Belarus's representative at the Vilnius EaP summit, as usual, it is exceptionally hard to forecast the decision to be made by the Belarusian president. Minister Makiej is the likeliest candidate, though. If some unfavorable events should mar the bilateral relationship before the summit, the status of Belarus's representative will easily be lowered to a deputy minister or even an ambassador, as it happened back in 2011. The option of non-participation in the summit looks improbable.

Developments in Belarus-China relations

+17



-2

Summary index: +15

Total positive points: +17

Total negative points: -2

Main trends

As long as financial difficulties persist in Belarus, the authorities have had to take a closer look at the results of collaboration with China. This review has become an instrument of struggle inside the government.

Not a single problem of the bilateral framework outlined in the previous Index issues (dominance of Chinese imports, limited lineup of Belarusian exports, virtual nonexistence of untied loans and direct investments, non-transparency of projects under implementation, low quality of supplied goods and equipment) became closer to its resolution during the two months under review.

The Chinese lobby in the Belarusian establishment continues to make efforts to hype the Chinese sector of Belarus's foreign policy and form the image of successful collaboration, albeit in the long term.

Description of the main events

In September and October, the principal events in the Belarus-China relations included the attempts by some high-ranking Belarusian officials to iron out the negative outcomes of Aliaksandr Lukashenka's unsuccessful visit to China in July 2013. As was mentioned in the previous issue of Belarusian Foreign Policy Index, the Belarusian side failed to get any new loans from official Beijing, whereas the total amount of contracts signed in China appeared to be minute. Overall, China's FDI in Belarus remains at a very low level.

The recent developments have somewhat marred the otherwise bright picture of Belarus-China relations and, most importantly, played into the hands of those against the policy of closer ties with China in the Belarusian establishment (whatever causes this position — the orientation towards Russia, the EU or bureaucratic strife with Anatol Tozik).

Essentially, the entire period under review was filled with declarations about the soonest possible implementation of some of the milestone Belarusian-Chinese projects; all of the declarations were either made or inspired by Deputy Prime Minister Tozik.

On 4 September, Tozik met with the top executives of Beijing Uni-Construction Group Co., Ltd (BUCC), which implements two major projects in Belarus: the construction of a residential district in Minsk's Liabiažy community and construction of the Beijing Hotel Complex. However, following the meeting, there were no reports to explain what stops Chinese contractors from performing construction operations and how the authorities would be dealing with the local population — dissatisfied with the way joint initiatives with China are implemented — when new projects are conceived. The financial aspect of Belarus's collaboration with BUCC remained vague. One can assume that in follow-up of the meeting, the Chinese developer will continue building the Minsk Chinatown while ignoring the opinion of the local residents. The situation will apparently become a matter for Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič to negotiate with the Chinese partners during his



visit to that country slated for December 2013.

On 11 September, Tozik participated in the opening ceremony of the European Confucius Institutes Forum 2013². The global network of Confucius Institutes as a Chinese "soft power" phenomenon is barely understood in Belarus and requires a thorough examination. However, the very fact that the head of the Confucius Institutes in PRC is a minister suggests that the initiative is a separate segment of China's state policy. "Sinicization" may be too strong a word for this at the current phase; however, efforts to promote Sinophilic moods, especially among the young, are obvious, and, importantly, these efforts are directly supported by the official Belarusian authorities.

On 4 October, Tozik presided at a meeting of the Belarusian part of the Belarusian-Chinese commission for trade and economic cooperation. The vice-premier was giving generous praise to joint Belarusian-Chinese projects. He made a specific note of the projects to upgrade the Belarusian cement-making plants, although neither the cost of modernization nor the quality of equipment supplied to the cement makers were discussed at the meeting.

The vice-premier also mentioned some new areas for cooperation with China, including solar and wind power. Unfortunately, China is not among the leading nations by the use of alternative energy sources, and in order to initiate new large-scale projects, some of the projects already underway should be completed first. However, a very important idea could be found in the vice-premier's words (that had previously been voiced by many experts): all of the Belarusian-Chinese projects are associated with the purchase of Chinese products of an uncertain quality. The country's benefits from the cooperative relationship with such an investor are rather vague.

Instead of reporting on the completed initiatives, the vice-premier preferred postponing the "peak" of the Belarusian economy resulting from its partnership with China until 2020, which will require another 150 projects, at least that is what Tozik's official statements sounded like on 9 October 2013, when he met with Wang Yuhang, Vice President of China CAMC Engineering Co., Ltd. (CAMCE) and representatives of that corporation in the CIS and the Republic of Belarus, as well as with Zhang Dajun, president of Harbin Dongjin Group.

On the following day, 10 October, Tozik met with a delegation of Heilongjiang, led by Sun Dongsheng, the vice governor of Heilongjiang Province. It was stated at the meeting that the construction of the external infrastructure of the China-Belarus Industrial Park (CBIP) would be finished by May 2014. However, there were no reports concerning the commencement of the construction of internal infrastructure facilities and deployment of USD30 billion worth of productions capable of boosting Belarus's exports by USD50 billion.

On 19-25 October, Tozik paid a visit to China to attend the 14th meeting of the Belarusian-Chinese commission for trade and economic cooperation. He had meetings with the senior officials of Harbin and BUCC, with Vice Premier of the State Council of the PRC Wang Yang, senior executives of Szechuan Province and Huawei.

The meeting resulted in the signing of a memorandum of the 14th session of the Belarusian-Chinese commission for trade and economic cooperation, protocol of the 2nd session of the CBIP intergovernmental coordinating council, agreement on the increase in the charter capital of the joint Belarusian-Chinese venture SZAO Company for the Development of the Industrial Park, memorandum on cooperation to support the industrial park project, investment agreement on the implementation of the investment project "Construction of a Production of Solar Panels in the Free Economic Zone Mahilioŭ", investment agreement on the implementation of the investment project "Construction of a 10-megawatt Photovoltaic Power Plant in the Free Economic Zone Mahilioŭ", memoran-

2 Confucius Institute at Belarusian State University - <http://rci.bsu.by/>

dum on joint activities in technical maintenance and repair of electric freight locomotives delivered from China, memorandum on cooperation in design between the planning and surveying republican unitary enterprise Institute Belzheldorproekt of Belarusian Railway and the China National Electric Import & Export Corporation (CUEC).

As we see, all of the postulated priorities in the development of Belarus-China relations — a boost in Belarus's exports and new beneficial loans and investments for industrial expansion — remained virtually neglected at the meeting.

The newly established BPC managed to sign a three-year memorandum with Sinofert (a division of the major petrochemical concern Sinochem) to supply potash fertilizers to China. However, neither the price nor the volume has been reported to the broad public, which along with reports of hikes in Uralkali's sales casts doubts on the "breakthrough" nature of the agreement. Incidentally, after the split with Uralkali, the new BPC had to sack its entire representative office in China. The Chinese managers Si Yuangong, Yu Hao, Fion Zhu, and Hu Rong turned out to have been de facto working for Uralkali (because Uralkali's position on dumping was in line with the interests of the Chinese authorities), and there was hardly anything to make them start working for the benefit of Belarus.

No one knows what has happened to the USD1.5 billion loan that the Belarusian authorities have been speaking about since January 2013. On 18 September 2013, Chair of the National Bank Nadzeja Jermakova resumed her comments on the loan, saying that Belarus was in talks with China over a USD500 million and 5 billion-yuan loan to finance investment projects. The total makes a bit less than USD1.5 billion. Importantly, almost two-thirds of that loan will be extended in yuan, which confirms the guesses of some experts that Belarus will be taking yet another tied loan.

Forecast for the near term

The attempts to use China as an additional pillar for the "pendulum-style" policy of official Minsk are gradually substituted for efforts to get easy money from China as soon as possible. In the coming months, the Belarusian authorities will likely increase their pressure on the Chinese partners in order to be able to tackle the current economic problems. However, there is little chance that China will provide new substantial financial injections.

Simultaneously the Belarusian authorities will be having a review of the Chinese sector of its foreign policy, which will result primarily in a bureaucratic confrontation between the proponents and opponents of that foreign policy endeavor.

Developments in Belarus's relations with the "developing world"

(Asia, Africa, Latin America)

Summary index: 15

Total positive points: +17

Total negative points: -2

+17

-2

Main trends

Belarus is tacitly adapting its foreign policy in the developing world to the reality of the unipolar world. The minimization of its relations with Iran and Syria amid more active contacts with the Arab monarchies and Turkey is a typical example.

Minsk persistently works on its relations with the opponents of the United States in Latin America, which are forced to forge alliances in order to be able to resist Washington. This factor creates potential opportunities for Minsk to promote its products to new markets, but there is no guarantee that it will take advantage of those opportunities.

An important achievement is the hard yet stable development of relationships with extremely promising partners in South and Southeast Asia. Importantly, new partners are added to old ones in this region, rather than replace them, unlike Belarus's policy in the Middle East. For instance, Belarus is deepening its engagement with Indonesia and Malaysia without phasing down its traditional ties with Vietnam.

Description of the main events

Latin America

Bolivia. On 4-5 September, Bolivian President Evo Morales paid a visit to Belarus. Commenting on the outlook for bilateral cooperation, the Belarusian state leader said that he was willing to work using the model of the Belarus-Venezuela relationship. Morales said that Belarus and Bolivia were making the first steps in their cooperation.

The presidents decided to establish a joint Belarusian-Bolivian commission for cooperation. The Belarusian part of the commission will be headed by Chief of the Presidential Property Management Directorate Viktor Šejman, who traditionally supervises Belarus's relations with Latin America, whereas the Bolivian part of the commission will be led by the head of the Administration of the Bolivian President. The vice president of Bolivia will also make part of the commission.

An official statement reads that the state leaders discussed not only economic projects, but also "place a high value on the cooperation in the military and technical sector and culture." Following bilateral negotiations, the foreign ministers signed an intergovernmental agreement on trade and economic cooperation, as well as an agreement abolishing visa requirements for holders of diplomatic, service and official passports³.

Ecuador. On 30-31 October, President of Ecuador Rafael Correa Delgado came to Belarus on an official visit. During his meeting with the Ecuadorean counterpart, Lukashenka "noted similar views of the two countries on the international agenda and a similar stance in the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement and other organizations, as well as identical un-

³ Aliaksandr Lukashenka meets with Bolivian President Evo Morales 04.09.2013 <http://www.president.gov.by/press146791.html#doc>

derstanding of what is going on in the world and shared aspiration to make the world multipolar”.

Delgado agreed with Lukashenka’s opinion that the potential of Belarus-Ecuador cooperation, as well as Belarus’s cooperation with entire Latin America remains unfulfilled. “Belarus is a highly developed nation when it comes to technology and science [...] And you share this knowledge with other nations of the world”.

The presidents mentioned successful collaboration between Belarus and Ecuador in oil exploration and production and noted that the positive experience should be applied to other cooperation areas. Specifically, the presidents spoke about the promotion of cooperation in power engineering, construction of power lines in Ecuador, joint production of engineering equipment and farm machines, as well as deeper cooperation in scientific and military and technical areas. It is planned that an Ecuadorean delegation led by the vice-president will visit Belarus soon to work out specific schemes to promote collaboration. Furthermore, the heads of state decided that Belarus and Ecuador would soon open embassies⁴.

Brazil. On 11 September, the Council of Ministers of Belarus issued a resolution to close by October the Belarusian Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). The decision was pursuant to presidential decree No.168 of 12 April 2013 “On certain arrangements to streamline the system of state administration and other state organizations, including the number of their employees”. Anyway, as soon as Belarus opened its embassy in Brazil, there were virtually no reasons for Belarus to keep its consulate in that country as well.

The Middle East

Turkey. On 9-14 September, Minsk and Mahilioŭ played hosts to the 1st meeting of the Belarusian-Turkish working group for industry and technology cooperation. The Belarusian part of the group is led by Deputy Industry Minister Aliaksandr Aharodnikaŭ, while the Turkish part of the group is headed by Sufyan Emiroglu, general director for industry at the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology. The main objective of the group is to prepare proposals as to the implementation of joint projects in industrial cooperation, as well as consider establishing a Turkish industrial zone in Belarus⁵.

On 31 October-1 November, Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej paid a visit to Turkey. The minister met with Minister of Science, Industry and Technology Nihat Ergün, Speaker of the Parliament of Turkey Cemil Çiçek, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. As a result of the 8th session of the Belarusian-Turkish joint intergovernmental economic commission, a protocol was signed between the governments on cooperation in the press and information, as well as a memorandum of cooperation between the National Agency of Investments and Privatization of Belarus and the Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey (ISPAT).

Iran. On 9 October, Foreign Minister Makiej met with president of Iran’s Kayson Mohammad Reza Ansari. They reviewed the investment projects implemented by Kayson in Belarus and discussed further cooperation opportunities.

On the following day, Uladzimir Makiej attended the opening of the first startup complex of the transport and logistics complex Prilesye built by Kayson. In case of a full-scale project implementation, the Iranian company may invest up to USD145 million in the project.

Despite the speculations by some journalists that Kayson managed to begin the implementation of the project “due to the friendly ties established between the two heads of

4 Aliaksandr Lukashenka meets with Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa Delgado <http://www.president.gov.by/press141048.html#doc>

5 On the holding of the 1st meeting of the Belarusian-Turkish working group for industry and technology cooperation 09-09-2013 http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news_mfa/bc1131f124bbea34.html

state”, it should be noted that Kayson is a privately-owned business, albeit with connections in some circles of the Iranian government (which hardly turn the investor into an instrument of Iranian state policy, though). The Prilesye project did not meet the original timeframe: the original deadline for the first startup complex was 2011, and in 2013, the developer was supposed to put into operation the second startup complex of the project. TUT.by quotes an expert familiar with the situation as saying: “This can hardly be called a full-fledged logistics center. We should wait and see what happens next. At the moment these are the best warehouses that we have in Belarus”⁶.

Also, very importantly, on the same day of 9 October, Minister Makiej met with Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development of Israel Yair Shamir. This is a perfect example of the Belarusian administration trying to meticulously avoid taking sides in the confrontation between Iran and Israel.

On 22-23 October, Deputy Foreign Minister Valiancin Rybakoŭ visited Teheran for Belarusian-Iranian political consultations. He had meetings with First Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran Morteza Sarmadi and other top officials of the Foreign Ministry of Iran. Rybakoŭ also met with Minister of Industry, Mine and Trade Mohammad Nematzadeh, head of the Majlis friendship group for cooperation with the Belarusian parliament and senior officials of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture⁷.

Asia

Mongolia. Prime Minister of Belarus Michail Miasnikovič paid an official visit to Mongolia on 3-5 September, the first visit of that level since 1992. Miasnikovič met with Prime Minister Norovyn Altankhuyag and Speaker of the Mongolian Parliament Zandaakhuu Enkhbold and attended the opening of the National Exhibition of Belarus in Ulan Bator. Miasnikovič pointed out that Belarus plans to “not only have trade relations with Mongolia [...] We came to set up new enterprises with our Mongolian colleagues and form added value”⁸. During his talks with Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, Miasnikovič discussed, among other issues, the organization of a transport corridor from Mongolia via Belarus to the Baltic Sea ports⁹.

Vietnam. On 10 September, Minsk hosted the 10th meeting of the Belarusian-Vietnamese intergovernmental commission for trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The Belarusian part of the commission is led by Deputy Foreign Minister Valiancin Rybakoŭ, and the Vietnamese part of the commission is headed by Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Le Duong Quang. Following the meeting, Belarus and Vietnam signed an updated economic cooperation program for 2013-2015. Ahead of the meeting, on 9-13 September, Minsk hosted the 3rd round of talks over the Agreement on the free trade area between the Customs Union/CES member states and Vietnam.

Indonesia. On 23-24 September, a Belarusian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Valiancin Rybakoŭ paid a visit to Indonesia. The delegation comprised First Deputy Agriculture Minister Leanid Marynič, officials of the central office of the Council of Ministers, Industry Ministry, Foreign Ministry and some Belarusian enterprises. The 4th meeting of the Intergovernmental Belarusian-Indonesian joint commission for trade, economic and technical cooperation was held during the visit. Rybakoŭ is the co-chair of the Belarusian

6 Makiej's Iranian friend opens the largest warehouse complex near Minsk 11 October 2013 <http://news.tut.by/economics/369952.html>

7 On consultations between the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Iran 23-10-2013 http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news_mfa/c739535013e950ab.html

8 Miasnikovič: Belarus plans to not only sell products in Mongolia 05.09.2013 http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2013/09/05/ic_news_113_424264/

9 Miasnikovič and Elbegdorj discuss opening a transport corridor from Mongolia via Belarus to the Baltic Sea ports 04 September 2013 http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/economics/Mjasnikovich-i-Elbegdorzh-obsudili-vozmozhnosti-organizatsii-transportnogo-koridora-iz-Mongolii-cherez-Belarus-k-portam-Baltii_i_645490.html

part of the commission; the Indonesian co-chair is Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Dian Triansyah Djani.

South Africa. On 3-4 September, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the minister of international relations and cooperation of South Africa, paid a visit to Belarus. Foreign Minister Makiej called South Africa "one of our key partners in Africa"¹⁰. Last year's two-way trade amounted to almost USD33 million. Nkoana-Mashabane was received by the Belarusian president and spoke about the plans of South African President Jacob Zuma to visit Belarus in 2014 following elections in that country.

Other. On 25 September, while in New York, Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej held bilateral meetings with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and Iran. Meetings were also held with the heads of the leading Jewish organizations of the United States and representatives of the U.S. Nuclear Threat Initiative; both meetings were held beyond the framework of the UN General Assembly.

During his meeting with the foreign minister in September, President Lukashenka mentioned the relationships with the former Soviet Union countries, the EU and the United States, but did not say a word about the developing world¹¹, only making a comment about the situation in Syria. He also spoke about Syria in his interview to 24 KZ television channel: "My attitude to the war in Syria is extremely negative [...] God forbid the Americans, or the entire NATO bloc should intervene, like they did in Libya, and start bombing — this will be a disaster. That is what will set the "Arab arc" on fire. It will certainly backfire, because Iran, too, will be involved in the conflict via Iraq, as well as other countries". Lukashenka also noted that Belarus shared Russia's stance on the problem¹². A few weeks before that, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry made a rather critical statement concerning the U.S. policy on Syria¹³, which became the first political statement of this kind made by official Minsk since the Syrian crisis erupted.

In September, Belarusian ambassador to Russia had meetings with the ambassador of Mozambique and El Salvador to Russia, whereas Belarusian ambassador to South Africa met with the ambassador of Namibia to South Africa. MTZ CEO Uladzimir Vaŭčok met with President of Sri Lanka Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Forecast for the near term

Foreign policy priorities in the developing world should be ranked as follows for the near term: Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and the south of Africa. The Middle East and North Africa remain too unstable for the Belarusian government, which has limited reserves to promote cooperation in the developing world.

Further moves to foster relationships in the south of Africa should be expected, including with South Africa and some neighboring countries — Mozambique, Angola and Namibia — as Belarus can benefit from their long established good relations with the USSR and later with Russia. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry has long been eyeing the East Afri-

10 Materials of the press availability of Belarus's Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej following his talks with Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa Maite Nkoana-Mashabane 03-09-2013 http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news_mfa/c1a7a543b2bf1288.html

11 Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej reports to Aliaksandr Lukashenka 10.09.2013 <http://www.president.gov.by/press146873.html#doc>

12 Aliaksandr Lukashenka's interview to 24 KZ television channel of the news agency Khabar 01.10.2013 <http://www.president.gov.by/press147308.html#doc>

13 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, 10 September 2013 http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news_mfa/c883f82db43e4166.html

can region.

Belarus continues adapting its policy on the developing world to the political standards of the western world. It is safe to say that in the near future, Minsk's policy in the Middle East will focus on the relations with Turkey and the fundamentalist Arab regimes — the allies of the West — while avoiding unnecessary contacts with Teheran and Damascus.

Minsk will keep making efforts to diversify its relations with Latin America; however, the circle of key partners has so far been limited to Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia.

Efforts to deepen contacts with the countries of South and Southeast Asia will become a long-term trend.



Developments in Belarus-Ukraine relations

Summary index: +8

Total positive points: +8

Total negative points: 0

+8

0

Main trends

During the period under review, the relations between Belarus and Ukraine were stepped up at the top political level. Lukashenka was commenting on Kyiv's European integration ambition on a regular basis; against the backdrop of the Kremlin's aggressive rhetoric, the stance on Ukraine adopted by the Belarusian leader looks as non-judgmental and conciliatory as it can be. Symbolically, the State Standardization Committee of Belarus reported that inspections revealed no violations in the products supplied by the major Ukrainian confectionery Roshen. The attack on Roshen became a publically significant "front" in Russia's trade war waged on Ukraine.

In September and October, Belarus and Ukraine avoided new serious trade conflicts. At the same time, there were no remarkable achievements in mutual trade and economic relations. It is also symptomatic that only secondary issues that do not have any potential to make changes in the established trade and economic framework were discussed during the Ukrainian premier's visit to Minsk. No serious plans were announced, either. Apparently, apart from geopolitical intrigues, the administrations of the two countries have no mutually interesting topics to discuss.

Lukashenka and Yanukovych have managed to overcome the old grudge; however, objectively, Ukraine and Belarus remain rivals in various areas — in trade, politics and geopolitical games, which stops the two countries from establishing a strategic partnership relationship.

Description of the main events

In September and October, President Lukashenka made a series of statements about the progress of the bilateral relationship with Ukraine in the context of the possible signing by Kyiv of the Association Agreement (including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) with the European Union. The topic is currently vital for Ukraine.

On 1 October, Belarusian Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič said during his meeting with Lukashenka that Belarus should seek Ukraine's full membership in the Customs Union. He also said that Belarus would be doing its best to preserve the established commercial relations with Ukraine even after it signed the Association Agreement: "Under no circumstances should Belarus ever lose its trade with Ukraine in this context; on the contrary, there may be some benefits for us to find. We have a very big market there."

On 7 October, Lukashenka said in the course of his meeting with Ukraine's Prime Minister Mykola Azarov that he believed the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU to be a virtually accomplished fact and suggested that the two countries should work out a formula for further relations between the Customs Union member states and Ukraine.

On 21 October, Lukashenka said that Russia would be the one to suffer the most from the Ukrainian Association Agreement with the EU. He also said that he was positive that the Customs Union member states would take joint action to seek protection against the negative aftermath of that move by Ukraine. "We will impose protective industrial or customs duties on certain products whenever necessary", the Belarusian president said. On 23 October, Lukashenka said that Belarus was historically "doomed" to cooperate with Ukraine. The relations with Ukraine should not be broken, whatever foreign policy choices Ukraine makes. "Let's imagine for a moment that Ukraine has joined NATO and has been fully involved in its processes", he said. "Are you saying that we will not have dialogue with Ukraine and will not find common language with it then? We are doomed to do so — based on our past, our present and even more so based on our future". He noted that the politicization of the "Ukrainian issue" would do nothing good.

On 25 October, the Belarusian president made more comments on Ukraine during his press availability for the Russian media. He warned that by signing the Association Agreement with the EU, Ukraine would "shut the way to the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. The low customs barriers in trade between the EU and Ukraine will affect us if we have open borders. If you want to join us, you should honor our agreements". He went on to say that the Customs Union doors were open to any country, and the Customs Union should work out constructive mechanisms to interact with Ukraine.

On 5 September, an agreement on cooperation in nuclear and radiation security was signed between the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine and the Nuclear Security Department of the Belarusian Emergencies Ministry during the visit of the head of the department Volha Luhoŭskaja to Kyiv.

On 13 September, a Ukrainian delegation led by Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Popov paid a working visit to Minsk to hold talks with the administration of Minsk City Executive Committee over the promotion of cooperation between the two capital cities, with focus placed on the possible expansion of trade, economic and humanitarian ties.

On 19 September, speaker of the lower chamber of parliament, the House of Representatives, Uladzimir Andrejčanka met with Ukraine's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Belarus Mykhailo Yezhel. An agreement was reached to step up inter-parliamentary contacts between the two countries.

On 23-24 September, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry played host to the first session of the Joint Ukrainian-Belarusian Demarcation Commission. The commission discussed the organizational issues of its activity, formed working groups to prepare requisite documents and approved the draft Provision on the demarcation of the state border between Ukraine and Belarus.

On 25 September, Astana hosted a bilateral meeting between the premiers of Belarus and Ukraine Michail Miasnikovič and Mykola Azarov. They reached an agreement to bring together a team of experts to review the development of trade and economic relations after Ukraine has introduced a free trade area with the EU. It was also agreed to create a transnational corporation to produce complex farm machines.

On 7 October, Prime Minister of Ukraine Azarov made an official visit to Belarus. He held negotiations with President Lukashenka and his counterpart Miasnikovič. Azarov focused on the pressing issues of bilateral cooperation, including the engagement with the Customs Union and, in a longer term, with the Eurasian Economic Union in the context of the upcoming signing of the Association Agreement with the EU. Following the talks, six documents were signed, including the "roadmap" for the development of bilateral cooperation for 2013-2015. Commenting on the results of his visit, Azarov said that he was "pleased with the position of Belarus on Ukraine's European integration ambition".

On 8-9 October, Belarusian Defense Minister Jury Žadobin visited Ukraine to hold talks with his Ukrainian counterpart Pavlo Lebedev. The ministers signed a cooperation plan for 2014 and agreed to continue working in the framework of the joint exercise "Slavic Community" in 2014.

On 17-19 October, a delegation of the Belarusian Industry Ministry led by First Deputy Industry Minister I. Dziemidovič paid a working visit to Dnipropetrovsk. The delegation negotiated a joint assembly production of Belarusian farm machines at M. Makarov Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant.

Forecast for the near term

The current surge in the political contacts is caused by external factors — the looming large-scale trade war between Ukraine and Russia, provoked by Ukraine's plans to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. So far, Lukashenka has been showing his respect for Ukraine's choice; however, this should not be regarded as some strategic preference. There is obviously a signal to force Vladimir Putin to make concessions in the areas, in which official Minsk is most interested. Lukashenka is aware that in the context of a trade war with Ukraine Putin will have to gather support of his Customs Union partners and plans to reap as many benefits as possible. Once problems with Russia have been handled, Lukashenka will hardly stay loyal to Kyiv, though.

Also noteworthy is the fact that the Ukrainian authorities do not have many levers to put Minsk under any serious pressure. This is especially true for the oil-processing sector: in the context of a "war" with the Kremlin, the ruling Ukrainian clans will be unable to resume oil imports from Russia, hence continued dependence on supplies of Belarusian-made gasoline.

Annex

Catalogue of events underlying the relations development index

Belarus-Russia relations

Date	Event	Point
September-October	Ongoing "potash" conflict between Belarus and Russia	-3
5 September	First Deputy Prime Minister U. Siamaška meets with Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Arkady Dvorkovich	+2
5 September	Ambassador to Russia I. Pietryšenka meets with Deputy Prime Minister of Russia O. Golodets	+1
6 September	Ambassador to Russia I. Pietryšenka meets with Russia's State Secretary, Deputy Foreign Minister G. Karasin	+1
9 September	A. Lukashenka meets with General Secretary of the Collective Security Treaty Organization Nikolai Bordyuzha. They discuss the preparation for the West 2013 military exercise	+3
10 September	Belarusian and Russian Foreign Ministries hold consultations on North America	+1
11 September	A. Lukashenka meets with President of OAO NK Rosneft Igor Sechin	+2
13 September	A. Lukashenka meets with Sberbank of Russia President and CEO H. Gref	+2
13 September	A. Lukashenka approves the draft agreement between Belarus and Russia on readmission as the basis for negotiations	+1
13 September	A. Lukashenka meets with OAO Gazprom CEO A. Miller. They discuss plans to step up cooperation between Belarus and Gazprom	+2
16 September	Belneftekhim concern and OAO NK Rosneft reach an agreement on oil supplies to the Belarusian oil refineries for the period to the end of 2013 and 2014	+2
18 September	Ambassador to Russia I. Pietryšenka meets with Governor of Russia's Tula Region V. Gruzdev	+1
26 September	A. Lukashenka attends the final phase of the joint strategic military exercise of the armed forces of Belarus and Russia West 2013 (together with Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin)	+3
26-27 September	First Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus A. Michnievič meets with Governor of Russia's Altai Krai A. Karlin	+1
27 September	Ambassador to Russia I. Pietryšenka holds working meetings with senior officials of Russian regions and financial institutions on the sidelines of the XII International Investment Forum	+1
1-2 October	A representative Belarusian delegation led by Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič visits St. Petersburg	+2
5 October	M. Miasnikovič has a telephone conversation with Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev	+2
7-8 October	A Belarusian delegation led by I. Pietryšenka visits Russia's Tambov Region	+1

Date	Event	Point
8 October	Consultations between the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Russia	+1
9 October	A Belarusian delegation led by I. Pietryšenka visits Tatarstan	+1
11 October	A. Lukashenka's press conference for the Russian media. Justifications for Belarus's policy on Russia (refusal to privatize MAZ, V. Baumgertner's arrest, non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, claims to Kaliningrad)	-1 -1 -1 -1
14 October	Sberbank CIB announces a 12-month extension of the loan to OAO Belaruskali	+1
18 October	I. Pietryšenka meets with Russia's State Secretary, Deputy Foreign Minister G. Karasin	+1
18 October	M. Miasnikovič meets with senior executives of ZAO Regional Airports. It is reported at the meeting that Belarus plans to invest about 3.5 billion Russian roubles in the development of the National Airport Minsk in 2013	+1
22 October	OOO Belorusneft-Siberia, a subsidiary of Belorusneft oil producer, acquires Russia's OAO Oil Company Yangpur, which produces oil and gas in Tyumen Region. Yangpur's recoverable reserves and resources total more than 40 million tons; annual oil and gas condensate production is more than 140,000 tons	+1
24-25 October	A meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. A meeting of the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS	+3
25 October	M. Miasnikovič meets with aide to the Russian president S. Glazyev	+2
31 October	Belarusian and Russian Foreign Ministries hold consultations on the OSCE and the Council of Europe	+1
31 October	Belarus plans to receive 23 million tons of oil from Russia in 2014 under a fuel balance, says First Deputy Economy Minister of Belarus Anatol Filonaŭ	+1
31 October	Belarusian automakers will enjoy support once Russia introduces the recycling duty on vehicles on 1 January 2014, says First Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir Siamaška.	+1
	Belarus incurs serious losses because of numerous regulatory exceptions in the Customs Union and Common Economic Space	-1
Total		+34

Belarus-EU relations

Date	Event	Point
5 September	Uladzimir Makiej meets with French Ambassador to Belarus Michel Raineri (who completes his diplomatic mission to Belarus)	+1
6-7 September	Aliena Kupčyna attends the Riga Conference; a series of bilateral meetings with foreign participants in the conference and Latvian officials	+1
9 September	Aliena Kupčyna makes a working visit to the UK	+1
12-13 September	Uladzimir Makiej takes part in a meeting of foreign ministers of the Eastern Partnership member states in Yerevan	+2
17 September	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Charge d'Affaires of Sweden to Belarus Martin Oberg	+1
20 September	Commencement of the Days of Culture of Belarus in Lithuania	+1
23-24 September	Deputy Economy Minister of Belarus Anton Kudasaŭ attends the ministerial meeting "Growth Potential in Central Europe" in Budapest	+1
23-27 September	A Belarusian delegation comprising representatives of the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry and Justice Ministry participates in the first meeting of the EaP working group on common security and defense policy	+1
24 September	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Gunnar Wiegand, director of Russia, Eastern Partnership, Central Asia, Regional Co-operation and OSCE, European External Action Service	+1
25 September	Uladzimir Makiej holds a bilateral meeting with his Bulgarian counterpart during a session of the UN General Assembly	+1
2 October	Aliena Kupčyna meets with British Ambassador to Belarus Bruce Bucknell	+1
2 October	Deputy Foreign Minister Aliaksandr Hurianaŭ pays a working visit to Vienna	+1
8 October	Aliena Kupčyna visits Hungary and meets with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán	+2
11 October	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Polish Ambassador to Belarus Leszek Szerepka	+1
14 October	Aliena Kupčyna and Aliaksandr Michnievič meet with State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia Peter Burian	+1
14 October	Belarusian Ambassador to Latvia Aliaksandr Hierasimienka meets with Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs	+1
17 October	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Director of the North and East Europe Department of the Czech Foreign Ministry Eliška Žigová	+1
22 October	Aliaksandr Hurianaŭ pays a working visit to Latvia	+1
24 October	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Political Director of the Foreign Ministry of Poland Jarosław Bratkiewicz and Director General for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of Sweden Torbjörn Sohlström	+1
25 October	Aliena Kupčyna meets with Head of EU Delegation to Belarus Maira Mora	+1
28 October	"Day of Belarusian Economy in Berlin", visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Aliaksandr Hurianaŭ and Deputy Economy Minister Anton Kudasaŭ to Germany	+1
September-October	A series of contacts between Belarusian diplomats and officials of the EU member states	+1

September- October	Negative statements by Belarusian officials about the EU policy and negative materials in the state media	-1
Total		+23

Belarus-China relations

Date	Event	Point
4 September	A. Tozik meets with senior executives of China's BUCC	+1
5 September	A. Lukashenka meets with member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee Liu Yunshan. The CBIP, proposal to establish a media holding, request of investments	+3
7 September	Belarus presents its investment potential at the 3rd China-Eurasia Expo, which took place on 2-7 September in Ürümqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region	+1
11 September	A. Tozik attends the opening ceremony of the European Confucius Institutes Forum 2013	+1
11 September	The China-Belarus Industrial Park is presented in Xiamen, Fujian Province	+1
18 September	Belarus and China are in talks over a USD500 million and 5 billion-yuan loan to finance investment projects, says Chair of the Board of the National Bank of Belarus Nadzeja Jermakova. The loan has not been disbursed so far	+1 -1
1 October	Belarusian Potash Company has no plans to reduce supplies of Belarusian products to Chinese consumers. Si Yuangong, Yu Hao, Fion Zhu, Hu Rong and Aliaksandr Suščević are no longer authorized to represent BPC in its relations with its business partners	+1 -1
4 October	A. Tozik presides at a meeting of the Belarusian part of the Belarusian-Chinese commission for trade and economic cooperation	+1
9 October	A. Tozik meets with Wang Yuhang, Vice President of China CAMC Engineering Co., Ltd. (CAMCE) and representatives of that corporation in the CIS and the Republic of Belarus, and with Zhang Dajun, president of Harbin Dongjin Group. More than 150 projects may be included in the program of comprehensive strategic partnership between Belarus and China for the period to 2020	+2
10 October	A. Tozik meets with a delegation of Heilongjiang Province, led by Vice-Governor Sun Dongsheng, The construction of the external infrastructure of the China-Belarus Industrial Park is expected to be completed by May 2014	+2
18 October	SZAO BelGee (Barysaŭ) automobile maker plans to attain 30% localization	+1
19-25 October	A. Tozik pays a working visit to China. The 14th meeting of the Belarusian-Chinese commission for trade and economic cooperation. Meeting with the senior officials of Harbin and BUCC. Meeting with Vice Premier of the State Council of the PRC Wang Yang. Meeting with senior officials of Szechuan Province and Huawei	+1
25 October	Belarusian Potash Company (BPC) signs a three-year memorandum for potash supplies to China with Sinofert, a division of the major petrochemical concern Sinochem)	+1
Total		+15

Belarus's relations with the "developing world"

Date	Event	Point
4-5 September	Bolivian President Evo Morales visits Belarus	+3
3-5 September	Prime Minister Michail Miasnikovič visits Mongolia	+3
3-4 September	Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa Maite Nkoana-Mashabane visits Belarus	+2
10 September	10th meeting of the Belarusian-Vietnamese intergovernmental commission for trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, attended by the deputy minister of industry and trade of Vietnam	+1
9-14 September	1st meeting of the Belarusian-Turkish working group for industry and technology cooperation, attended by Sufyan Emiroglu, general director for industry at the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology	+1
23-24 September	A Belarusian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Valiancin Rybakoŭ visits Indonesia	+1
1 October	Belarus closes the Belarusian Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro	-2
22-23 October	Deputy Foreign Minister Valiancin Rybakoŭ visits Teheran	+1
30-31 October	President of Ecuador Rafael Correa Delgado visits Belarus	+3
31 October -1 November	Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makiej pays a working visit to Turkey	+2
Total		+15

Belarus-Ukraine relations

Date	Event	Point
September-October	As opposed to Russia's aggressive rhetoric, Belarusian President A. Lukashenka makes a series of non-judgmental statements concerning Ukraine's European integration ambition	+1
19 September	Speaker of the House of Representatives Uladzimir Andrejčanka voices his willingness to step up inter-parliamentary contacts with Ukraine during his meeting with Ukraine's Ambassador to Belarus Mykhailo Yezhel	+1
23-24 September	Belarus's Foreign Ministry plays host to the first session of the Joint Ukrainian-Belarusian Demarcation Commission. Work on border demarcation is given an impetus	+1
25 September	A bilateral meeting between Belarusian Prime Minister Miasnikovič and Ukrainian Prime Minister Azarov is held in Astana	+1
7 October	Official visit to Minsk by Ukraine's Prime Minister Mykola Azarov; Azarov holds negotiations with President Lukashenka and Prime Minister Miasnikovič	+2
8-9 October	Belarusian Defense Minister Jury Žadobin visits Ukraine to hold talks with his Ukrainian counterpart Pavlo Lebedev	+2
Total		+8

Event ranking scale:

- Economic and political integration, creation of customs unions, common markets, supranational bodies (ratification and coming into effect of relevant treaties) – **5-7 points**
- Signing/ratification of a crucial agreement (on cooperation, trade, tariffs, visa-free travel, etc., signing of documents on integration) – **4 points**
- Top-level official visit (president and premier) and bilateral meetings – **3 points**
- Large-scale interstate contract, loan arrangement, provision of economic aid – **3 points**
- Official visit at the level of a minister (key ministers: foreign minister, interior minister, defense minister, economy minister, finance minister, trade minister) and head of the presidential administration; contract negotiations – **2 points**
- Official visit at the level of a deputy minister (and non-key ministers), a parliamentary delegation, exhibition, business forum, days of national culture, important diplomatic contacts and negotiations – **1 point**
- Positive statements by the president, Belarusian Foreign Ministry, parliamentary resolutions, positive materials in state or state-controlled media (monitored media include Sovetskaya Belorussia, BelTA, Zviazda, Belarusian Television – 1st National Channel, 2nd National Channel) – **1 point**
- Adverse statements by the president, Belarusian Foreign Ministry, media, adverse parliamentary resolutions, negative materials in the state media – **minus 1 point**
- Protraction of ratification of treaties, non-invitation to events, failure to provide support internationally – **minus 2 points**
- Infringement of treaties, default on mutual commitments (by the Belarusian side) – **minus 3 points**
- Trade wars, antidumping investigations – **minus 3 points**
- Commodity boycotts, embargoes, recall of diplomats, ambassadors – **minus 4 points**
- Severance of diplomatic relations, provocations, military operations – **minus 5-7 points**