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Belarusian Institute
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BISS POLITICAL MEDIA BAROMETER

(April-June 2013)

Introduction

The Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) presents its fifth quarterly report **BISS Political Media Barometer (April – June 2013)**. It analyzes the political communication of the Belarusian political forces and their media coverage, summarizing the findings of the first six months.

Following our mission as a non-partisan, independent Belarusian think-tank, we designed this product with one major goal in mind: to scientifically analyze the quality of the political communication between the Belarusian democratic political forces and the society, and contribute to its improvement.

To accomplish this goal, the BISS Political Media Barometer provides an objective quantitative analysis of the media appearances of the Belarusian political forces, plus 23 individual politicians, based on the systemic monitoring of the available open media sources.

After six months of analyzing the political communication, we can now formulate a number of recommendations on how to improve the political forces' communication strategies. The findings also show some pinch points in the relations between the media and the independent political figures. In general terms, there has been a certain progress of the political communication. It is the first time since we have launched our media monitoring project that the politicians have quite often discuss the economic issues. The percentage of the economy-related communication has doubled in compare with the previous quarter which does not only mean a diversification of the political forces' agenda, but it also brings it closer to the general public and their priorities.

The authors of the *BISS Political Media Barometer* are grateful to the International Board of the project for their insightful comments and recommendations. We are open to discussion on the research methodology, dimensions of analysis and data interpretation. All responsibility for any errors or shortcomings rests solely with the BISS.

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Contents

Introduction 1

Contents 2

Summary and recommendations 3

Methodology: units of analysis 6

Detailed research findings 8

Quantitative index 8

Qualitative index15

Where and how the opposition speaks17

Appendix 1. Media usage in Belarus41

Appendix 2. Description of methodology43

Appendix 3. Detailed findings46

Summary and recommendations

The present report covers the political communication field from April to June 2013. On one hand, this was the time when the political forces have not yet actively begun preparing for the forthcoming elections. On the other, the analyzed period was marked by active preparatory work towards forming a coalition of political forces called 'The People's Referendum' campaign. Within its framework, the campaign 'Tell the Truth!', The Movement for Freedom, the BPF Party and the Belarusian Social Democratic Party *Hramada* declared that they are going to join forces during the run-ups to the local and presidential elections. The second quarter of 2013 was quite eventful in terms of the international activity of the political forces. The opposition members participated in the conference on Belarus organized by the European People's Party in Brussels on April 9 and they appealed to the EU to ease the visa regulations; also, they had a number of meetings in the Lithuanian Parliament on April 15 and addressed the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the conditions that would allow the EU to start bringing its relations with Belarus back to normal. The analyzed period also covered the traditional rally 'Chernobyl Way', which marked twenty seven years since the Chernobyl disaster. This event determined an increase in the media presence for the politicians who were actively involved in organizing it. The exact figures regarding the media presence of the politicians, as well as the contributing factors, are presented in detail in the **Detailed research findings**.

If we speak about the changes in the political communication field, it is necessary to take a close look at the main trends revealed in the previous stages, i.e. from April 2012 till March 2013. Among them we can list:

- The presence of the stable variables that most commonly refer to the representation of the independent political forces in the media, i.e. the level of events that receive coverage, the position of the politicians speaking for their political forces, the gender composition of representatives, etc.; these variables are difficult to influence;
- The presence of the changeable variables that include the content of communications in the first place, i.e. their topics, correlation with practical activities, etc.; these variables depend on the political forces to a greater extent;
- the instability and the volatility of the information field, when the focus of media attention shifts in time:
 - from 'personal stories' to 'the political agenda' and vice versa;
 - from the forces inside the country to those outside Belarus and vice versa.

Thus, the basic patterns of the political field revealed two major dichotomies.

Until recently, the focus of media attention swung like a pendulum between the forces active in and outside the country¹, which was an important factor in determining the leader of the rating. Now it is obvious that this pattern has become a thing of the past. Traditionally Andrey Sannikau and Anatol Liabedzka swapped places at the top of the rating. However, during the previously analyzed period, Sannikau moved to the third position and in April – June he only came sixth. Meanwhile, the political figures

¹ By 'forces active outside the country' we mean those that are registered abroad or whose leaders live in exile.

representing the forces active in Belarus strengthened their positions in the 'top-12'. This might indicate changes in the political media field, with less coverage given to the politicians in exile and a growing attention to the forces active inside the country. However, the time span of one quarter of year is too short to reach a final conclusion, as the analyzed period was marked by such significant events as the 'Chernobyl Way' rally or the launch of the 'People's Referendum' campaign and the responding criticism.

The second dichotomy describing the changes in the communication field comes from the shift of focus from the **political agenda** to the **'personal story'** and vice versa. The analysis of the communication from April to June 2013 shows that these two opposite subjects remain in the focus of media attention. In April Paval Seviarynets held the leading position in the quantitative index. The major issue that attracted the media attention was the estimation of the chances of the politician (sentenced to custodial restraint) to spend Easter with his family. Another example of 'personal story'-driven quantitative index was an upsurge in Liabedzka's media presence late in April, when the regime increased its pressure on the politician. However, it was the political agenda that formed the basis of media coverage in the second quarter. This is demonstrated, for example, by a boost in the ratings of certain political forces such as 'Tell the Truth!' campaign, the Movement for Freedom and the BPF Party, following their press conference on May 20 when they announced their strategic partnership plans for the three forthcoming elections.

The content of the communication still remains highly variable. This gives the political forces an opportunity to shape such parameters as the topics covered, the correlation with the offline activities and the share of proactive political communications. It should be pointed out that, on one hand, the **distribution of communications by the topic is becoming more balanced** and diverse. All the topics, including the economy-related ones, are now better represented and the political actors and forces seem to have found a solution to the problem of domination of one key thematic group. On the other hand, the **share of proactive communications**, i.e. the media coverage of the politicians presenting the new programs, projects or tactics/strategies **is considerably going down**. This is also a factor considered in the qualitative index.

The variables concerning the representation of the political forces remain more stable and are less affected by the political forces. They include mentioning the political figures' affiliation in the media coverage, the ranking of the politicians who represent their political forces in the media, the gender distribution of the representatives and the level of the events covered. Generally speaking, these parameters have not changed considerably as compared to the previously analyzed periods. However, the representation tends to become less diverse, with fewer regional leaders and common members, as well as women, speaking on behalf of their political forces.

Thus, there were both positive and negative changes under way in the field of political communications.

The positive trends were as follows:

- The media were giving more coverage to the political actors and forces with a higher rate of offline activity and with a larger share of proactive communications. Thus, following Anatol Liabedzka, the traditional leader in the media presence rating,² the second, third, fourth and fifth positions were held by Uladzimir Niakliayeu, Aliaksandr Milinkevich, Aliaksiey Yanukevich and Vital Rymasheuski, respectively.
- The thematic distribution of the communication content was more balanced. The leading topics in the political communications were more diverse. The analyzed period was marked by a growth in the coverage of various themes such as the international relations, domestic politics and the social sphere. The share of references to economy-related issues also increased, up to 15%.

The negative trends were as follows:

- For both the individual politicians and the political forces, the growth in their own communications slowed down. This cannot be attributed to an increase in the number of media references, since the total sum of references to politicians fell from 3,900 in January – March to 3,084 in April – June 2013.
- The number of initiatives dwindled. During the analyzed period it was only Andrey Dzmitriyev and Dzmitry Vus who came up with new projects or initiatives. This factor contributed essentially to a drop in the other politicians' qualitative index (for the methodology of calculating the qualitative index see the **Qualitative index**).
- The ratio of proactive communications, i.e. those instances when political actors create coverage opportunities on their own initiative, shrunk. At the same time the share of reactive communications, i.e. those references in which political actors simply react to external events, grew to 85%.
- The percentage of regional representatives and female voices also decreased, which could lead to a decline in the attention paid by the audience to the political forces, customarily represented by the same key figures.

² It is a quantitative index, calculated based on the number of references made to the political actor and on the media outreach.

Methodology: units of analysis

Throughout the year, the BISS Political Media Barometer's slightly changed the sample from one issue to another, including the individual politicians, the political forces and coalitions that demonstrated the most active media presence. However, the unstable media presence figures on one hand, and the criteria of data comparability on the other, have prompted to a different approach to sampling. Guided by expert opinions and by the analysis of the developments in the political media field, we have opted for the following sampling principle.

The first-level units of analysis include thirteen political forces. The second-level units of analysis are two representatives from each political force, 'leader+1'. The sample of individuals may change, depending on how active the representatives of political forces are in the information field. Exceptions from this principle are made for the units of analysis that do not represent any political force but act as the voices of the political prisoners, like Maryna Adamovich, or which, more often than not, participate in the political communication field without any reference to their political affiliation, like Stanislau Shushkevich and Dzmitry Vus.

A number of political forces are represented in the present report by their leaders only. These include the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada with Iryna Veshtard, 'For Fair Elections' campaign with Viktor Karniayenka, the BPF Conservative Christian Party with Zianon Pazniak, 'Our Home' campaign with Volha Karach, the Young Front with Nasta Dashkevich and the Belarusian United Left Party 'A Just World' with Siarhiey Kaliakin. The list can be extended if the political forces decide have other spokespersons, with comparable media presence figures. The data on the individual politicians from this list will be featured in the monitoring findings, even if their political forces are not mentioned in the media. Yet, other political figures mentioned in the media topics involving the political forces are going to be monitored. This enables us, on one hand, to offer a list of media representatives for each political force and on the other, to show how often the individual politicians from the list are mentioned in connection with their political forces.

Our analysis of the media presence for the coalitions of political forces (April 2012 to March 2013) showed that the political forces are most commonly referred to without mentioning the coalitions they belong to. Even the launch of the 'People's Referendum' campaign on May 20 resulted in only 1.5% references to the political parties as members of coalitions. Although coalitions tend to be less active between elections, the objective of evaluating their media performance is still on our agenda. As new coalition projects emerge, the list of coalitions to be monitored can be expanded.

Thus, during the analyzed period we identified, codified and described 3,084 references to twenty three individual politicians and thirteen political forces. (Among them is 'For Fair Elections' campaign, which was established in order to monitor elections and does not function between elections. Yet, it is included in the analysis, considering the prospect of an upsurge in its activity, so that its dynamics can be monitored.) Our sample is limited to the independent political actors and forces³ only; the ruling elites were not considered within the framework of the project.

³ Please, note that we stick to a very broad notion of politicians/political actors. In Belarus these are not necessarily individuals publicly contesting for a state office. In a situation when the opposition has been deprived of any opportunity to influence the decision-making process on any of the state levels for over a

The political forces are tentatively split into two groups: those active in Belarus and outside the country. The latter includes the political forces whose leaders are forced to live in exile or those that are registered abroad. They are singled out due to certain limitations imposed on their activities.

Each communication subject is described in terms of: political affiliation, gender, and position in their political organization. The qualitative and quantitative indices that we produce in the report (*to be explained in detail further in the text*), allow us to identify the trends and compare the actors, making a media profile of each political force/individual politician. The table below lists the individual political figures and forces that the report focuses on.

Table 1. The categories analyzed in the BISS Political Media Barometer

Political forces	Representatives
'Tell the Truth!' civic campaign	1. Uladzimir Niakliayeu 2. Andrey Dzmitriyev
The United Civil Party	3. Anatol Liabedzka 4. Leu Marholin
The BPF Party	5. Aliaksiey Yanukevich 6. Ryhor Kastusiou
The Movement 'For Freedom'	7. Aliaksandr Milinkevich 8. Juras Hubarevich
The Belarusian Christian Democracy	9. Vital Rymasheuski 10. Paval Seviarynets
'European Belarus' civil campaign	11. Andrey Sannikau 12. Iryna Khalip
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party <i>Hramada</i>	13. Iryna Veshtard
The Liberal Democratic Party	14. Siarhiey Haidukevich 15. Aleh Haidukevich
The Belarusian United Left Party 'A Just World'	16. Siarhiey Kaliakin
The Young Front	17. Nasta Dashkevich (Palazhanka)
The Conservative Christian Party BPF	18. Zianon Pazniak
'Our Home' civic campaign	19. Volha Karach
'For Fair Elections' campaign	20. Viktor Karniayenka
'People's Referendum' coalition	During the analyzed period the coalition was just being set. For this reason the present report describes only the basic characteristics of its media presence. Its comprehensive media profile is going to appear in the next issue.
Political affiliation is not traced	21. Stanislau Shushkevich
	22. Dzmitry Vus
	23. Maryna Adamovich

decade, those who are considered as politicians may come from different backgrounds/have very varied jobs and occupations.

Detailed research findings

Quantitative index

1. The total presence in the media for individual politicians and political forces, by the number of references

The Quantitative Index is calculated as a numerical score for each political force and individual politician, based on the size of the resources' audience, according to www.audience.by (see **Appendix 1**) and on the number of articles that mention a politician or a political force (each article is treated as one reference, no matter how many times the name of the political force or of the politician appears). The index consists of three components:

- 1) the media presence (online media and printed press),
- 2) political actors' and forces' own communication (political parties' websites, affiliated informational portals, Facebook accounts), and
- 3) the total presence, which combines both the media coverage and the political actors' and forces' own communications.

The research findings for April – June 2013 show that Anatol Liabedzka, who also led in the previous quarter's ratings, came first by the quantitative index. Even though the total number of political communications decreased, as comparing to the previous stage, the number of references to this public figure and his total presence index were much higher than in January – March. This time, the 368 references brought Liabedzka 1,704 points (cf.: 197 references and 1,241 points in January – March). The growth can be attributed to Liabedzka's participation in the conference on Belarus held by the European People's Party in Brussels on April 9 and to the meetings held in the Lithuanian Parliament on June 26, as well as to his role in organizing the 'Chernolyt Way' rally and the accompanying events. (The former two activities determined an increase in the amount of topics referring to foreign policy and international relations) Uladzimir Niakliayeu managed to keep the second position in the ratings, though his total presence score fell from 1,210 points gained by 244 references in January – March to 953 points and 192 references in April – June 2013.

Aliaksandr Milinkevich, Aliaksiey Yanukevich and Vital Rymasheuski came third, fourth and fifth, respectively. In the early 2013, the media tended to focus their attention on those politicians who acted in Belarus rather than on those whose index depended on external factors and keen curiosity about their private circumstances. We can see that the trend continued into the second quarter. Thus, Yanukevich's and Milinkevich's total presence indices steadily went up again, in line with this trend. Yanukevich, who rose from the twelfth to the fifth position in the January – March ratings, this time ranked fourth. As for Milinkevich, he moved from the seventh to the sixth place in the first quarter and now came third in the quantitative index rating, with 920 points and 197 references.

It was the first time that our research had included Volha Karach, who ranked twentieth, having scored 109 points and 19 references. While the previous quarter's 'top-12' included four women, namely Iryna Khalip, Maryna Adamovich, Natallia Radzina and Nasta Dashkevich (Palazhanka), this time it was only Maryna Adamovich who made it into the 'top-12', with 407 rating points and 59 references.

Table 2. The total presence in the information field for individual politicians

Politician	Number of references	Total presence index	Position in the rating
Anatol Liabedzka	368	1 704	1
Uladzimir Niakliayeu	192	953	2
Aliaksandr Milinkevich	197	920	3
Aliaksiey Yanukevich	167	858	4
Vital Rymasheuski	148	795	5
Andrey Sannikau	108	664	6
Andrey Dzmitriyev	84	482	7
Maryna Adamovich	59	407	8
Paval Seviarynets	70	368	9
Leu Marholin	61	305	10
Ryhor Kastusiou	58	284	11
Zianon Pazniak	46	249	12
Juras Hubarevich	58	225	13
Aleh Haidukevich	30	203	14
Siarhiey Kaliakin	38	199	15
Iryna Khalip	31	189	16
Stanislau Shushkevich	22	145	17
Nasta Dashkevich (Palazhanka)	22	136	18
Siarhiey Haidukevich	17	130	19
Volha Karach	19	109	20
Iryna Veshtard	26	107	21
Dzmitry Vus	11	83	22
Viktar Karniayenka	7	15	23

2. The individual politicians: media presence vs. their own communications

The upward trend in the share of individual politicians' own communications that we described during the previously analyzed period did not continue in the second quarter. The share of Anatol Liabedzka's own communication raised from 22% to 47% of the total references and for Uladzimir Niakliayeu the percentage of his own communications also grew, even though less strong than Liabedzka's, from 34% to 41%. At the same time, the shares of Aliaksandr Milinkevich's and Aliaksiey Yanukevich's own communications slightly fell, from 44% to 40% and from 43% to 38%, respectively. In the previous quarter the dynamics of politicians' own communications and their positions in the ratings led us to the conclusion that a growth in the number of their own communications provided a certain increase in the media presence. In this research stage, we can conclude that a lower share of their own communications does not result in the politicians' lower positions in the ratings. Thus, Milinkevich rose from the sixth to the third position and Yanukevich moved from the fifth to the fourth place. It can therefore be stated that the impact of one politicians' own communications on the general rating is only limited.

In terms of their own communications, it was Viktar Karniayenka (71%), Iryna Veshtard (65%), Juras Hubarevich and Leu Marholin (59%) who led during the analyzed time span. In this stage, it was the first time that we deliberately traced Leu Marholin's communications. He ranked tenth among the individual political actors. His major topic is economy; he comments on such issues as privatization, Russian business in Belarus and the chances of another devaluation of the Belarusian ruble. On one hand, the higher shares of these politicians' own communications are a direct outcome of the media's lower attention. On the other hand, the agenda of their own communications gives them a lot more opportunities to shape their own political image.

Table 3. The individual politicians: media coverage vs. their own communications

Politicians	Media coverage		Their own communications		The share of their own communications in the total presence
	Number of references	Index	Number of references	Index	
Anatol Liabedzka	194	1 530	174	174	47%
Uladzimir Niakliayeu	114	875	78	78	41%
Aliaksandr Milinkevich	118	841	79	79	40%
Aliaksiey Yanukevich	103	794	64	64	38%
Vital Rymasheuski	80	727	68	68	46%
Andrey Sannikau	83	639	25	25	23%
Andrey Dzmitriyev	45	443	39	39	46%
Maryna Adamovich	51	399	8	8	14%
Paval Seviarynets	50	348	20	20	29%
Leu Marholin *	26	270	35	35	57%
Ryhor Kastusiu	36	262	22	22	38%
Zianon Pazniak	35	238	11	11	24%
Juras Hubarevich *	24	191	34	34	59%
Aleh Haidukevich	22	195	8	8	27%
Siarhiev Kaliakin	21	182	17	17	45%
Iryna Khalip	25	183	6	6	19%
Stanislau Shushkevich	18	141	4	4	18%
Nasta Dashkevich	17	131	5	5	23%
Siarhiev Haidukevich	12	125	5	5	29%
Volha Karach	11	101	8	8	42%
Iryna Veshtard *	9	90	17	17	65%
Dzmitry Vus	8	80	3	3	27%
Viktar Karniayenka *	2	10	5	5	71%

* - Leaders by the share of their own communications

3. The political forces: the total presence in the information field, media coverage and their own communications

'Tell the Truth!' civic campaign is the traditional leader in terms of the total presence in the information field. Its index has hardly changed; it scored 2,180 points as compared to 2,063 points in the previous quarter. This is evidence of a solid foundation for the communication policies of 'Tell the Truth!' campaign, which contrasts with the more dynamic ups and downs in its leader's total presence.

During the analyzed time span, the political forces' ratings on the whole correlated with those of their leaders. 'Tell the Truth!' campaign, the United Civil Party, the BPF Party, the Movement 'For Freedom', Belarusian Christian Democracy and 'European Belarus' campaign were the 'top-6'. (The latter took the sixth position, just like its leader did in the individual rating.) The political forces' indices were invariably higher than those of their representatives. When a political force ranks lower in the ratings than its leader, it can be concluded that its communications were by and large related to only one representative, i.e. its leader. Although Uladzimir Niakliayeu ranked second, the 'Tell the Truth!' campaign maintained the leading position. In contrast, the UCP's communications were more leader-centered, so it came second in the total presence ratings, even though Anatol Liabedzka remained number one by the individual total presence index. The same is true for the Movement 'For Freedom' and the BPF Party. Aliaksandr Milinkevich, the leader of the Movement 'For Freedom', ranked third, while his political force took the

fourth position, falling behind the BPF Party. Thus, if one representative of a political force is leading, this does not automatically improve the performance of their political force. The political forces' total presence scores largely depended on the diversity of their representation in the media.

During the analyzed interval the growth in the shares of political forces' own communications slowed down in comparison with January – March. (The same is true for the political actors.) Not yet receiving sufficient media coverage, 'For Fair Elections' campaign and the 'People's Referendum' campaign took over the leading positions by the share of their own communications, 68% and 61%, respectively. The share of their own communications for the 'Tell the Truth!' campaign, which ranked first in the previous quarter, dropped from 56% to 52%. The UCP meanwhile repeated its closest competitor's last quarter's achievement, with 56% of their own communications.

Just like in the previous quarter, the Liberal Democratic Party held the mid position in the ratings, ranking seventh of the thirteen political forces. The party's quantitative index of total presence in the information field changed only insignificantly, from 456 points in January - March to 398 points in April - June. The number of references remained virtually the same, 55 ones in the second quarter as compared to 58 at the previous stage. The party has a relatively low share of its own communications – 31%, which points to an underdeveloped potential for increasing its media presence by creating coverage opportunities on its own resources.

'Our Home' civic campaign, which was monitored for the first time, ranked twelfth among the thirteen political forces. Overall, this is correlated with its leader Volha Karach's position in the individual total presence index. However, 'Our Home' campaign got eighteen references, which is even fewer than the nineteen references to its leader. This is evidence of the potential for increasing its media presence by diversifying its representation and by consistently declaring the leader's political affiliation. The share of its own communications makes up to 33%, which also indicates the potential for growth.

Table 4. The total presence of the political forces in the information field

Political forces	Number of references	Total presence index	Position in the rating
'Tell the Truth!' civic campaign	487	2 180	1
The United Civil Party	522	2 113	2
The BPF Party	362	1 747	3
The Movement 'For Freedom'	320	1 425	4
The Belarusian Christian Democracy	316	1 397	5
'European Belarus' civic campaign	84	531	6
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party	114	456	7
<i>Hramada</i>			
The Liberal Democratic Party	58	398	8
The 'People's Referendum' Coalition	77	322	9
The Belarusian United Left Party 'A Just World'	77	295	10
The Young Front	63	283	11
The BPF Conservative Christian Party	39	228	12
'Our Home' civic campaign	18	112	13
'For Fair Elections' campaign	22	60	14

Table 5. Political forces: media coverage vs. their own communications

Political forces	Media coverage		Their own communications		Share of their own communications in the total presence
	Number of references	Index	Number of references	Index	
'Tell the Truth!' civic	235	1 928	252	252	52%
The United Civil Party *	230	1 821	292	292	56%
The BPF Party	210	1 595	152	152	42%
The Movement 'For Freedom'	167	1 272	153	153	48%
The Belarusian Christian Democracy	150	1 231	166	166	53%
'European Belarus' civic campaign	66	513	18	18	21%
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party <i>Hramada</i>	54	396	60	60	53%
The Liberal Democratic Party	40	380	18	18	31%
'People's Referendum' Coalition*	30	275	47	47	61%
The Belarusian United Left Part 'A Just World'	37	255	40	40	52%
The Young Front	31	251	32	32	51%
The BPF Conservative Christian Party	28	217	11	11	28%
'Our Home' civic campaign	12	106	6	6	33%
'For Fair Elections' campaign*	7	45	15	15	68%

* - Leaders by the share of their own communications

4. The dynamics of the total presence over time

The following charts depict the quantitative index dynamics for the political actors and forces. Chart 6 represents a timeline of quantitative index accumulation for the 'top-12' politicians. (They scored at least 240 points, since the 'top-12' threshold steadily keeps going down, this time from 360 points in January - March to 240 points during the analyzed time interval).

In the second quarter the political actors accumulated their indices quite gradually. However, Anatol , who came first by the number of references, had performed similarly to the others until late April, when his media presence boosted. This could be partially attributed to his role in organizing the 'Chernobyl Way' rally. Yet, the other factor was the increased pressure on the politician, who risked facing the seizure of property for failing to pay a fine and was exposed to the police's attempt to enter his apartment, under the pretext of searching for unregistered weapons.

The 'Chernobyl Way' also led to an increase in Vital Rymasheuski's and Aliaksiey Yanukevich's total presence in the information field. Yet, it was Pavel Seviarynets who kept the lead throughout April, after the number of references to the political actor boosted early in the month in connection with the permission to celebrate Easter with his family. Uladzimir Niakliayeu, Aliaksandr Milinkevich and Aliaksiey Yanukevich dramatically

increased their total presence scores following the press conference on May 20, when they announced that their political organizations had reached an agreement to work together in the three forthcoming elections.

Chart 7 presents the dynamics of total presence index accumulation for the political forces. The comparison of the chart profiles for the political actors on the one hand and for the political forces on the other reveals when exactly the politicians' total presence growth was induced by their 'personal stories' vs. by their political activities. In the latter case, a surge in their individual indices was accompanied by a growth in the indices of their political forces. For example, when Niakliayeu's, Milinkevich's and Yanukevich's total presence indices went up following their press conference on May 20, so did those of their political forces. By contrast, Paval Seviarynets's leading position in April and the upsurge in references to Anatol Liabedzka later that month had no impact on the dynamics of total presence index accumulation for the Belarusian Christian Democracy or the United Civil Party.

The index accumulation chart shows how the 'Tell the Truth!' campaign, which fell behind the UCP in April, first boosted its presence in the information field and caught up with the latter thanks to the news of its application for registration with the Ministry of Justice on May 8, and then went on to take the lead following the press conference on May 20.

Chart 6. Accumulation of the total presence index for individual politicians





Chart 7. Accumulation of the total presence index for political forces



Qualitative index

The **qualitative index** was introduced in order to compare in what capacity the politicians were referred to in the media. The qualitative index is composed of 3 sub-indices:

- *Expertise* (includes a political actor's appearances in the media as an expert, commentator or author of analytical materials);
- *Initiative* (includes the media coverage of politicians presenting new programs, projects or tactic/strategy of the activity); and
- *Action* (coverage of specific actions taken by a political actor or force during the analyzed period, for example, when a leader participates in a round table or a rally).

The total sum total of all the politicians' indices in each of the three areas is 100 points. The individual indices for 'Expertise', 'Initiative' and 'Action' show the share of each political actor's contribution to the media coverage in that capacity and in the given dimension⁴. Below are the plots for the 'top-12' politicians, by the total quantitative index.

The key feature of the communications' content during the analyzed period was a decrease of the amount of initiatives presented by the political actors. Except for Andrey Dzmitriyev, who also led by the share of 'initiative' in January – March 2013, none of the 'top-12' political actors had any communications that could be regarded as 'initiative'. The qualitative index reflects each politician's contribution to the sub-indices individually, created by all the rated political actors. For this reason Dzmitriyev scored 75 points for 'initiative', while the remaining 25 points were distributed among those figures that did not make the 'top-12'. That is why Dzmitriyev maintained his leading position by qualitative index, with 84 points out of 300.

In the other two dimensions, i.e. 'expertise' and 'action', the chart of the qualitative index is similar to the chart of the quantitative index. In other words, as the number of references goes down, so does the qualitative index. In all the aspects except zero initiative for the 'top-12' politicians, the distribution of the qualitative index is more balanced than it was in the previous quarter, which was marked by discrepancies between the quantitative and qualitative indices in the 'top-12'.


For all the political actors except Dzmitriyev, who leads in the qualitative index, the share of 'expertise' is equal to or slightly exceeds the 'political action'.

⁴ The maximal index for each dimension is 100 points, so the maximal qualitative index can be 300 points.


Chart 8. Distribution of the qualitative index parameters




Ment.=368 Quant.=1704 Qual.=43,5




Ment.=192 Quant.=953 Qual.=17,1




Ment.=197 Quant.=920 Qual.=18,1




Ment.=167 Quant.=858 Qual.=15,5




Ment.=148 Quant.=795 Qual.=21




Ment.=108 Quant.=664 Qual.=12,5



Ment.=84 Quant.=482 Qual.=84,1




Ment.=59 Quant.=407 Qual.=8,9



Ment.=70 Quant.=368 Qual.=10,7



Ment.=61 Quant.=305 Qual.=6,8



Ment.=58 Quant.=284 Qual.=5,7



Ment.=46 Quant.=249 Qual.=4,5


Where and how the opposition speaks

1. The distribution of total presence by source

In the four previous monitoring stages the distribution of the sources containing/publishing political communication basically remained unchanged. In April – June 2013 these changes appeared insignificant, too. We can still state that the pattern is quite stable, so political actors and forces should make an effort and alter the model of their relations with the media if they want to increase or reduce the share of certain information sources.

After an initial decrease in the share of the independent press (down to 4% in January – March 2013), in the second quarter it went back to 12%. The upward trend in the use of partisan resources persists. Their share increased from 30% to 38%. The growth, however, can be attributed to the methodological changes in sampling and to a larger proportion of political actors who actively represent their political forces. This is supported by the fact that the percentage of individual politicians' own communications diminished rather than grew during the analysis interval

Chart 9. Distribution of appearances in the information field by source




2. How do the independent Belarusian political forces use the available information field

Just like the previously monitored periods, April – June 2013 showed positive dynamics in the themes of communications, though this time the area of change was different. In the previous quarters the social sphere was receiving increased attention, while the economy-related issues still received little consideration. However, during the second quarter the imbalance in the themes was redressed. The social sphere remained among the top priorities, though it gave way a little bit to international relations and domestic politics. International relations received a lot of coverage mainly thanks to the conference on Belarus held by the European People's Party in Brussels on April 9, to the opposition leaders' meetings in the Lithuanian Parliament on April 15, and to the joint address of the opposition leaders to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 19. Domestic politics was featured by and large, covering mostly the regional initiatives, the training session of the Constitution for 'Tell the Truth!' and the BPF Party activists, and the discussion around the legal status of the members of the Parliament by 'Our Home' campaign.

It was the first time since our monitoring was launched that the economy-related topics received wide coverage. Until the second quarter, their proportion never exceeded 6 or 7%, but this time it surged to 17.6%, which can mean a few things. First, this higher share diversified the political parties' agendas, which could have a positive impact on their image. Second, the economic issues are more relevant to the general public than the political subjects, so bringing the economy to the foreground could help the political parties make their agendas more appealing to the voters.

In April – June 2013 the gap between the most and the least covered topics narrowed down, which also made the themes of communications look more balanced. In the previous quarter 75% of all communications referred to the social sphere and only 3% dealt with rights and freedoms. This time, by contrast, the international relations (the topic that received the biggest coverage) were subject of 41% of communications, while the least popular theme of internal partisan issues was referred to in 13% of communications.

Chart 10. Topics of communications



Overall, the political forces were able to reach a balance in the distribution of topics of their communication acts. All the major subjects of the political communication field paid more attention to the economy-related issues. As for 'European Belarus' campaign and the Belarusian Christian Democracy Party, their distribution of topics in a way differed from the others', as they gave much less attention to the elections. In the BCD's case, the reason is that they are still undecided about the elections and the two coalitions that are now being formed. By contrast, 'Our Home' campaign discussed the elections more actively than the others. The international relations were in the focus for all the political forces except for 'For Fair Elections' campaign.

Just like the previous quarter, the current one did not show any essential differences in the distribution of the topics covered by the political forces inside and outside the country. The proportions of most topics tended to converge. However, some traditional differences were still maintained. For example, compared to the forces inside Belarus, their 'foreign' counterparts showed more interest in such topics as repressions and social sphere and less interest in domestic politics.

Chart 11. Distribution of topics of communications for political forces





Chart 11.1 Distribution of topics for groups of political forces

3. The correlation between the offline activities and the political communications

The correlation between the politicians' offline activities and their media presence is calculated as the proportion of references related to the politicians' real-life actions in their total media coverage. Here we analyse media coverage only, i.e. we count the media references to offline activities. These include the political forces' media activities, such as statements, press-conferences and interviews, and their own communications like postings and publications on parties' websites, blogs, Facebook accounts etc. The offline activities include the internal partisan events and the activities aimed at the electorate and international audience, such as foreign trips and meetings with foreign politicians (see **Appendix 2**). The monitoring deals with only those offline activities that were mentioned by the media or promoted in the media by the political forces. That is why the regional activities, to give just one example, that were not promoted or reported in the media do not feature in the research findings.

This time, there was a certain growth in the offline activities (or their media coverage) as compared to the previous quarter. Interestingly enough, we once again noticed considerable differences in the percentage of offline activities depending on the month. In other words, the previous quarter's pattern was repeated. The smallest proportion of offline activities in the media coverage was observed in April – only 28% after a relative boost in March 2013, when it reached 51%. Then, there was a certain growth in May – up to 34% – and in June the percentage of offline activities reached a maximum share of 58%. Thus, in June over half of the media references to the political actors and forces mentioned their real-life actions.

The dynamics of the offline activities in the media coverage during the two quarters of 2013 may lead to the conclusion that this variable follows a cyclical pattern. There were clear spikes in March and June. It may have something to do with the specific features of political forces' work. Since the offline activities require a certain amount of preparation,

there are times when they dwindle. Another factor could be significant dates (holidays) associated with traditional activities, such as Freedom Day or the Chernobyl Way. The next research stage will give us a chance to see if our assumption is correct, as it does not include any traditional history-related events.

In the previous quarter the main type of media covered offline activities were the press conferences. By contrast, in April – June there were the round tables discussions and debates with other politicians that came to the fore and these were mentioned in 67% of media references to offline activities. (This development is in line with a relative growth in the topics associated with domestic politics.)

Chart 12. The correlation between the offline activities and the political communications





Chart 13. Types of offline activities⁵



During the previous reporting period the proportion of the offline activities in the media coverage was roughly equal for the forces inside and outside the country – 37% and 35%, respectively. In April – June, by contrast, the share of the offline activities of the forces inside the country markedly exceeds that of their ‘foreign’ counterparts – 44% vs. 29%.

⁵ The sum total exceeds 100%, as one article can mention several events.

Chart 14. The media coverage of political forces' activities





Chart 14.1. The media coverage of activities, for groups of political forces




4. The levels of political actors' and forces' activity level in the media

In analysing the levels of political subjects' activity, we distinguish between proactive, reactive and passive communications. Here, 'proactive' refers to cases when politicians come up with a new initiative, acting as newsmakers for the media. 'Reactive' is about those instances when politicians react to external circumstances. 'Passive' refers to the cases when the politicians or the political forces receive coverage on the initiative of the media, without any proactive or reactive steps made by the political subjects themselves.

The analysed period was marked by a steady rise in the reactive communications and by a downward trend in the proactive one. Reactive communications made up to 85% of the total, while the proportion of proactive communications fell from 15% in January – March to 6% in April – June and the passive ones dropped from 24% to 9%. The trend may have a negative impact on the political actors' and forces' images, depicting them as subjects that only react to external circumstances, like the latest developments in international relations, instead of taking an active stance in the political field.

Besides, the reactive communications do influence the growth of passive ones, which reflect the media's own interest to the political field. It can therefore be argued that the levels of activeness in communications need improving.

Chart 15. Levels of activeness in communications



In the second quarter the differences in activeness between the forces inside and outside the country evened out. The forces inside the country can be tentatively divided into two groups: 1) those whose communications had a certain share of proactive

communications, albeit a small one (the UCP, 'Tell the Truth!' campaign, the BPF Party, the BCD and the *Hramada* Party) and 2) those whose communications were only reactive and passive. The latter held lower positions in the ratings. We would recommend the political forces to increase their shares of proactive communications, in order to improve their total media presence.

Chart 16. Distribution of levels of activeness in communications





Chart 16.1. Distribution of levels of activeness for groups of political forces



5. Types of representation of the political forces in the media

The four previous research stages revealed that the overall media profile of the political forces' representatives in the media was a rather stable feature of political communications. It became clear that the media profile was more difficult to be influenced by political forces than the topics of communications, the share of offline activities in the media coverage or the activeness in communications. This conclusion is supported by the research findings for the analysed interval.

This is particularly true about the positioning of individual politicians as representatives of political forces. Although we reviewed the methodology to shift the focus of the monitoring towards political forces, in April – June 2013 the proportion of references to politicians with and without mentioning their affiliation remained the same as in the previous quarter – 73% vs. 27%, respectively.

In order to trace the roots of stable individual representation without mentioning the political affiliation, let us consider this variable for each actor. If we take the leading group of politicians acting inside the country, there is a marked difference between Uladzimir Niakliayeu and Aliaksandr Milinkevich, on the one hand, and Anatol Liabedzka, Aliaksiey Yanukevich and Vital Rymasheuski, on the other. The former had a relatively big proportion of media appearances without reference to their political forces, while the latter seldom spoke in other instances than on behalf of their parties.

If we consider the politicians who represent the most active forces alongside their leaders, Andrey Dzmitriyev, Juras Hubarevich and Ryhor Kastusiou had a rather low share of media appearances without reference to their political affiliation. By contrast, Leu Marholin represented his political force in only 41% of references. He was most commonly positioned as an independent expert, not affiliated with the UCP.

Besides, Volha Karach was mentioned more often than 'Our Home' campaign, and quite often – namely in 26% of references – he appeared in the media not as a representative of 'Our Home' campaign.

Chart 17. The positioning of messengers





Chart 17.1. The positioning of the individual politicians in the media



As for the position of the political forces’ representatives, their pattern was similar to the model established in the previous research stages. As the methodology changed, the already miniscule proportions of rank-and-file activists and regional members decreased. This supports the assumption that the political forces maintained a certain share of representation by rank-and-file activists just because some of these individuals were traced deliberately.

Of all the political forces active inside the country, only the ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign had a share, albeit a minor one, of alternative spokespersons. 100% of references to the UCP, the BPF Party, the BCD and the Movement ‘For Freedom’ featured only their top leaders or one of the leaders.

Only the Young Front had a sufficient share of references to a regional leader and the BPF Conservative Christian Party was represented by a common regional member.

Chart 18. The positions of the political forces' representatives




Chart 19. The positions of the political forces' representatives, for each force




Chart 19.1. The positions of representatives for groups of political forces




Chart 20. The positions of the political forces' representatives by resource





Chart 21. Representation by gender



The proportion of female voices dropped from over 15% (in January – March 2013 the figure was 16%) to 7% only, the absolute minimum throughout the monitoring. It was the forces outside the country that accounted for the fall, as the 'insiders' customarily had a low percentage of female representation. In January – March 2013, the share of female voices who represented the forces outside the country made up 37%. By contrast, this time the figure plummeted to 6%, even though the two key personalities, Nasta Dashkevich (Palazhanka) and Iryna Khalip, were still included in the analysis.

The shares of parties, movements and coalitions remained as stable as previously. The coalition activity was still low, but it has the potential for growth as the elections approach. This is substantiated by the creation of the 'People's Referendum' coalition and by the plans to work together during the three forthcoming elections, announced by the BPF Party, the 'Tell the Truth!' campaign and the Movement 'For Freedom'. (The parties that belong to the 'People's Referendum' coalition even accounted for the modest 2.3% of the total references to political forces.)

Chart 21.1 Representation by gender for groups of political forces





Chart 22. Representation by the type of political forces



6. The levels of events figuring in the information field

Just like in the previous research stages, the distribution of the levels of events in the information field in April – June followed a stable pattern. There was a slight difference, in that the proportion of international events grew from 14% to 24%, while the share of national events reduced from 59% to 52%. Although the proportion of regional representatives dropped notably in the second quarter, the coverage of the regional events in the information field still made up 12%, just as it did in January – March.

Chart 23. Levels of events





Chart 23.1. Levels of events by source



7. In what capacity are the politicians referred to in the information field

The large number of round table discussions and meetings between the opposition members, as well as the traditional ‘Chernobyl Way’ rally, allowed the political actors to increase their share of references as participants in events. However, the proportion of references to politicians as experts also grew from 10% to 18%, as compared to the previous time span. A certain growth in ‘active’ media appearances correlates with the higher figures of offline activities covered by the media.

Chart 24. Types of references





Chart 25. The distribution of types of references for individual politicians



8. The evaluation of the political actors and forces in the information field

In April – June 2013 there were no essential changes in the evaluation of the monitored forces. However, we could see a certain growth in the references that contained an evaluation of the political actors or forces. Thus, the instances of positive evaluation of the political forces grew from 3% to 6%, as compared to the previous quarter, while the negative evaluation increased from 2% to 5%.

Of all the monitored channels of communication, positive assessment was most often found on parties’ Facebook accounts (8%), while the largest proportion of negative assessment – 5% – was present in the independent online media.

Chart 26. The evaluation of the politicians




Chart 27. The evaluation of the political forces





Chart 28. The evaluation of the political sources, by source



Appendix 1. Media usage in Belarus

1.1. The penetration of Internet (urban population aged 18 to 64)

How often do you use the Internet?	Number of respondents	%
I do not use the Internet and do not have a connection	251	25,10%
I do not use the Internet but I have a connection	117	11,70%
Every day	446	44,60%
3 to 5 times a week	69	6,90%
1 to 2 times a week	82	8,20%
1 to 3 times a month	25	2,50%
Less than 1 time a month	10	1,00%
Total	1000	100,00%

1.2. The audience coverage

	Audience	Coefficient
Independent Belarusian online media (percentage of audience coverage; source: gemiusAudience 04-06/2013)		
belaruspartisan.org	-	5
charter97.org	6,5%	10
ej.by	1,9%	5
naviny.by	5,6%	10
news.tut.by	20,6%	25
udf.by	1,6%	5
svaboda.org	-	5
nn.by	2,5%	5
Independent Belarusian press (print-run)		
Naša Niva	7000	1
Belgazeta	20500	1
Narodnaja Volia	27700	1
Belorusy i Rynok	14000	1
Nationwide government press (print-run)		
SB. Belarus segodnya	400100	1
Respublika	40000	1
Zviazda	34200	1
Narodnaya gazeta	30000	1
Partisan informational portals		
ucpb.org	-	1
camarade.biz	-	1
narodny.org	-	1

bchd.info	-	1
zaprdu.info	-	1
europeanbelarus.org	-	1
statkevich.org	-	1
mfront.net	-	1
sieviarynets.net	-	1
bsd.org	-	1
narodnaja-partyja.org	-	1
pyx.by	-	1
ldpb.net	-	1
Political forces' Facebook accounts (number of subscribers)		
UCP: https://www.facebook.com/unitedcivilparty	694	1
A Just World: facebook.com/groups/ck.smir/	393	1
Tell the Truth!: http://www.facebook.com/Pravdaby	1 032	1
Young Front: facebook.com/mfront.net	285	1
Belarusian Social Democratic Party <i>Hramada</i> : facebook.com/groups/152445731538229/?ref=ts	14	1
Movement 'For Freedom': http://www.facebook.com/groups/ruch.za.svabodu/	-	1
Politicians' Facebook accounts (number of subscribers)		
Dzmitriyev: http://www.facebook.com/Belarusian	3 969	1
Niakliaev: https://www.facebook.com/Uladzimir.niakliaev	-	
Rymasheuski: http://www.facebook.com/rymasheuski	-	1
Liabedzka: https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100001776806548&fref=ts	-	1
Kaliakin: https://www.facebook.com/kaseiv.smir?fref=ts	-	1
Yanukevich: https://www.facebook.com/alaksej.janukevich	772	1
Kastusiov: https://www.facebook.com/rkastusiov?fref=ts	-	1
Hubarevich: http://www.facebook.com/yury.hubarevich	-	1
Sannikau: https://www.facebook.com/andrei.sannikov.1	-	1
Adamovich: https://www.facebook.com/marina.adamovich.3	-	1
Dashkevich (Palazhanka): https://www.facebook.com/Nasta.palazhanka	-	1
Pazniak: https://www.facebook.com/ZyanonPaznyak	342	1

Appendix 2. Description of methodology

2.1. Sampling

We used the following resources to evaluate the representation of the political actors and forces in the information field (see Appendix 1):

1. The independent Belarusian online media
2. The independent Belarusian press
3. The national government press
4. The partisan informational portals
5. The Facebooks accounts of the political forces
6. Politicians' Facebooks accounts (only those which are used for communication on relevant topics).

All the news items, even repeated by different sources, are evaluated because they are contact-points with the audience and are aggregated in the Total Rating Points. This principle is not applied to simple links, to other resources or to videos.

2.2. The methodology of index composition

The Quantitative index for each political force and individual politician is calculated based on the size of the audience of each resource (see **Appendix 1**) and on the number of references in the articles from that resource. (One article is considered as one reference, no matter how many times the name is repeated.) The index includes three sub-indices:

- 1) The media coverage (online media and press);
- 2) The political actors' and forces' own communications (partisan informational portals, Facebook accounts);
- 3) The total presence.

The audience coverage for each resource is measured as the proportion of the total audience coverage (according to www.audience.by).

The possible intersections of the audience of each politician are not taken in consideration. The index is calculated as the total sum of accumulated media rating points. It correlates with the number of contacts with the audience. These contacts can refer to different people (if the audiences do not intersect) and reflect the scope of influence, or to the same people (if the audiences do intersect) and reflect the strength of influence (repeated contacts provide better retention and increase the effect of presence).

The audience coverage which is used to calculate the index is digressively proportional, where the minimal coverage is taken for 1% and maximal coverage is taken for 40%. The principle of digressive proportion is used because of the low penetration of independent online media. The usage of straight proportion could lead to insignificant results and there is a risk of getting a result which would be about zero. The principle of smoothing the differences between the audience coverage allows us to have comparable indices. The audience coverage of the individual politicians' resources is assumed to be 1% as well. The total presence index is divided into media coverage (online media and the press,) and political actors' and forces' own communications (parties' websites, affiliated portals and Facebook accounts that are used for communications on relevant topics).

Moreover, the quantitative index is enriched with the content analysis of the media that give coverage to each politician and/or political force. This enables us to analyze the topics, genres and types of representation.

A comparative **qualitative index** is used in order to compare politicians by type of representation and by the range of topics. The qualitative index is composed of 3 sub-indices:

- *expertise* (it includes the appearances in the media as an expert, commentator or author of analytical materials),
- *initiative* (it includes the appearances in the media where politicians present new programs, projects or tactic/strategy of the activity), and
- *political action* (based on the activity presented in the media during the evaluated period).

The qualitative index shows the share of each politician's appearances in all the news items, in each of the three dimensions (expertise, initiative, and political action) and to what extent the topics of communications are balanced. The requirement to have balanced topics of news is highly important for Belarus because the absence of initiatives and projects in the areas relevant to electorate is a weak point of political forces. Each topic has the same weight for the value of sub-indices.

8. 3. Table of content analysis

	Category	Value
1	Date	
2	Type of source	1. The independent Belarusian online media 2. The independent Belarusian press 3. The national government press 4. The partisan informational portals 5. The Facebook accounts of political forces 6. Politicians' Facebook accounts
3	Name of source	
4	Audience coverage	
5	Link	
6	Politician	
7	Gender	1. male 2. female
8	Type of representation of political force	1. Top leader 2. One of the leaders/member of the Board 3. Regional leader 4. Rank-and-file member from the metropolis 5. Regional rank-and-file member 6. Not a representative 7. Other
7	The political force represented	
8	Type of political force	1. Political party 2. Movement 3. Coalition 4. Party as part of a coalition 5. Other
9	Genre	
10	Language ⁶	
11	The role of the politician	1. Main character 2. One of the main characters

⁶ The language of the articles on bilingual resources is defined as the one used by default.

		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. A character among others 4. Leading expert/commentator 5. One of experts/commentators 6. Other
12	The evaluation of the politician	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Positive 2. Negative 3. Neutral 4. No evaluation (when the article is contributed by the politician himself)
13	The evaluation of the political force	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Positive 2. Negative 3. Neutral 4. No evaluation (when the politician does not represent the political force)
14	Type of reference	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Participant in the events 2. Comment on the events 3. Expert opinion 4. General reasoning 5. New project/initiative 6. New strategy 7. Mentioned in passing 8. Other
15	Activeness ⁷	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Proactive 2. Reactive 3. Passive
16	Level of events	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International 2. National 3. Regional 4. Personal
17	Topic	
18	Correlation with offline activities	
19	Concrete event	
20	Type of offline activity ⁸	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rally, meeting with the electorate 2. Round table discussion, debate with other opposition members 3. Party meeting 4. Press conference 5. Foreign trip 6. Meeting with foreign politicians 7. Statement 8. Appeal 9. Other
21	Direction of activity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Electoral 2. Internal 3. External 4. Media 5. Political actors' and forces' own communications 6. No activity reflected

⁷ 'Proactive' refers to the cases when politicians come up with a new initiative, acting as newsmakers for the media. 'Reactive' is about those instances when the politicians react to external circumstances. 'Passive' refers to the cases when the politicians or political forces receive coverage on the initiative of the media, without any proactive or reactive steps by the political subjects themselves.

⁸ Type of offline activity includes activities which are initiated by the politicians and it does not include activities initiated by the media, like interviews, comments, participation in TV/radio programs as experts, etc.)

Appendix 3. Detailed findings

Chart 29. The topics of communication




Chart 30.1. The accumulation of the total presence index for individual politicians by date




График 30.2. The accumulation of the total presence index for individual politicians by date




Chart 31.1. The accumulation of the total presence index for political forces by date




Chart 31.2. The accumulation of the total presence index for political forces by date

