Does the increase in Belarusians’ incomes have any impact on the level of confidence in the incumbent president? Does the attitude of citizens to the centralized social system of the distribution of benefits depend on the rate at which their incomes increase, and how does the growth in incomes modify their geopolitical orientations? This BISS research indirectly confirms one of our earlier hypotheses that the reasons why the Belarusians still support the political status quo are overall quite trivial and are mostly based on rational calculations; citizens can “wish” a market or a new president only at times when flows of material support from the state start running slower.
Having ascertained the pragmatism of the Belarusians, BISS has arrived at three major conclusions:
1. The rate of growth in real incomes of the population has a direct influence on the president’s credibility level: the faster compensations are pushed higher, the higher the level of trust in the incumbent, and the lower the pace at which wages grow, the lower the number of Lukashenka’s supporters. That said, we should also note that the president’s credibility indicators are subject to slight fluctuations, which nevertheless do not change the overall trend.
2. The real wage growth rate shapes the “market” orientation of the Belarusians: the lower the pay rise rate, the bigger the number of those advocating an economy with a weaker state regulation. On the contrary, the faster real wages grow, the more citizens are willing to observe the “strong hand” of the state in the economy.
There is no direct correlation between the dynamics of the Belarusians’ geopolitical orientations and income growth rates. We should rather be talking about a combination of several external factors, which call for a separate analysis that would be beyond the framework of this paper.
Read full text of research “Political business cycle in Belarus or political economy of trust in president” in pdf.
